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ABSTRACT 
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October 2019 
 
Voltage and angle stability along with the thermal loadability of the transmission lines are limiting 
the transmission capacity of the Nordic power system. Voltage stability after a dimensioning fault 
limits the transmission capacity of the Finnish power system when power is imported from Swe-
den to Finland. When power is exported from Finland to Sweden, the damping of the inter-area 
electromechanical oscillations is the transmission capacity limiting factor. The oscillations appear 
in many power system quantities, but they are usually referred to as the power oscillations. 
 
In transmission capacity calculation, limiting values for the operation of the power system are 
used as calculation criteria, which determine the allowed operating conditions. The effects of 
choosing the limits for voltage stability and damping of power oscillations on the transmission 
capacity and security margins of the Finnish power system are examined in this thesis. The trans-
mission capacity calculation criteria are applied in various operating conditions, and it is examined 
how the transmission capacity and security margins would change if different criteria were used. 
The research methods include load flow- and dynamics calculation. In addition, the damping of 
the power oscillations is examined utilizing the Prony’s method. 
 
The research indicated that decreasing the limit for voltage stability would increase the transmis-
sion capacity but decrease the security margins. The transmission capacity was discovered to 
differ between various operating conditions considerably. On the other hand, smaller fluctuation 
was observed in the security margins between various operating conditions. Based on the studied 
operating conditions, the security of the Finnish power system does not appear to be endangered 
if the voltage stability calculation criterion is slightly decreased. An evident difference in the damp-
ing of the power oscillations was observed between the summer and winter operating conditions. 
The summer situations were observed to be more sensitive regarding power oscillations due to 
fewer generators equipped with power system stabilizers in operation compared with the winter 
situations. Especially, the impact of the largest generators on damping emerged in the research. 
The security margins were considerably smaller in the summer situations than in the winter situ-
ations when the damping ratios were used as calculation criteria. The currently used calculation 
criterion for power oscillations was observed to produce more consistent security margins com-
pared with the examined damping ratio based criteria.   
 
 
Keywords: transmission capacity, voltage stability, rotor angle stability, electromechanical 
oscillation, damping   
 
 
The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service. 
ii 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Jani Stenroos: Siirtokapasiteetin laskentakriteerien arviointi 
Diplomityö 
Tampereen yliopisto 
Sähkötekniikan diplomi-insinöörin tutkinto-ohjelma 
Lokakuu 2019 
 
 
Pohjoismaisessa voimajärjestelmässä siirtokapasiteettia rajoittavia tekijöitä ovat jännite- ja kul-
mastabiilius sekä siirtojohtojen terminen kuormitettavuus. Mitoittavan vian jälkeinen jännitestabii-
lius rajoittaa Suomen voimajärjestelmän siirtokykyä tuotaessa tehoa Ruotsista Suomeen. Suo-
mesta Ruotsiin tehoa vietäessä siirtokykyä rajoittava tekijä on alueiden välisten sähkömekaanis-
ten heilahtelujen vaimentuminen. Heilahtelut näkyvät monissa eri voimajärjestelmän suureissa, 
mutta niihin viitataan usein tehoheilahteluina. 
 
Siirtokapasiteettilaskennassa sovelletaan voimajärjestelmän käytön raja-arvoja laskentakritee-
reinä, jotka määrittävät sallitut käyttötilanteet. Tässä työssä tutkitaan jännitestabiiliudelle sekä te-
hoheilahtelujen vaimentumiselle asetettujen raja-arvojen valinnan vaikutusta Suomen voimajär-
jestelmän siirtokapasiteettiin sekä käyttövarmuusrajoihin. Siirtokapasiteettilaskennassa käytettä-
viä raja-arvoja tutkitaan erilaisissa käyttötilanteissa, ja tarkastellaan, miten siirtokapasiteetti ja 
käyttövarmuusrajat muuttuisivat eri raja-arvoja laskennassa käytettäessä. Tutkimusmenetelminä 
käytetään tehonjako- sekä dynamiikkalaskentaa. Lisäksi tehoheilahtelujen vaimentumista tutki-
taan Pronyn menetelmällä.  
 
Tutkimus osoitti, että jännitestabiiliuden raja-arvon pienentäminen kasvattaisi siirtokapasiteettia, 
mutta pienentäisi käyttövarmuusrajoja. Siirtokapasiteetin havaittiin vaihtelevan eri käyttötilan-
teissa merkittävästi. Toisaalta käyttötilanteiden välinen käyttövarmuusrajojen vaihtelu oli vähäi-
sempää. Tutkittujen käyttötilanteiden perusteella Suomen voimajärjestelmän käyttövarmuus ei 
näytä vaarantuvan jännitestabiiliuden raja-arvoa maltillisesti pienennettäessä. Tehoheilahtelujen 
vaimentumisessa havaittiin selvä ero kesä- ja talvikäyttötilanteiden välillä. Kesätilanteiden havait-
tiin olevan herkempiä tehoheilahtelujen suhteen johtuen käytössä olevien lisästabilointipiirillä va-
rustettujen generaattoreiden vähäisemmästä määrästä verrattuna talvitilanteisiin. Tutkimuksessa 
nousi esiin erityisesti suurimpien generaattoreiden vaikutus vaimennukseen. Käyttövarmuusrajat 
olivat kesätilanteissa huomattavasti pienempiä kuin talvitilanteissa vaimennuskertoimia lasken-
nassa käytettäessä. Nykyisin käytössä olevan tehoheilahtelujen laskentakriteerin havaittiin tuot-
tavan yhdenmukaisemmat käyttövarmuusrajat verrattuna tutkittuihin vaimennuskertoimiin perus-
tuviin kriteereihin.  
 
 
Avainsanat: siirtokapasiteetti, jännitestabiilius, roottorin kulmastabiilius, sähkömekaaninen 
heilahtelu, vaimennus   
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ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS 
AC Alternating Current 
CIGRE International Council on Large Electric Systems (French: Conseil In-
ternational des Grands Réseaux Électriques) 
DC Direct Current 
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FB Flow Based method 
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FRM Flow Reliability Margin 
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IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
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PTDF Power Transfer Distribution Factor 
P1 Transmission cut between northern and southern Finland 
RAC AC connection between Finland and Sweden 
RAM Remaining Available Margin 
RDC HVDC connection between Finland and Sweden 
RSC Regional Security Coordinator 
SSA Static Security Assessment  
TRM Transmission Reliability Margin 
TSO Transmission System Operator  
TTC Total Transfer Capacity 
 
 
𝐴 amplitude 
𝐴0    initial amplitude 
𝑓 frequency 
𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥   maximum flow 
𝑃   active power 
𝑡 time 
𝑇𝐷   damping torque coefficient 
𝑇𝑒    electrical torque 
𝑇𝑆   synchronizing torque coefficient 
𝑉 voltage 
 
 
𝛿   rotor angle 
𝜁   damping ratio 
𝜏   time constant of damping 
𝜔   angular speed 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The growing volume of renewable energy resources in the power system combined with 
the increasing inter-country power transmission has made controlling and predicting of 
the usable transmission capacity more complicated. To ensure the efficient electricity 
market, the utilization of the power systems’ transmission capacity is aimed to be 
maximized in the European Union.   
A centralized calculation service provider of the Nordic transmission system operators, 
the Nordic Regional Security Coordinator, is launching its operations. The Nordic 
Regional Security Coordinator will produce some calculations formerly performed by the 
national transmission system operators, such as transmission capacity calculation. The 
varying calculation methods and criteria of the Nordic transmission system operators 
would be beneficial to harmonize as the Nordic Regional Security Coordinator begins to 
conduct the calculations. The goal of this thesis is to analyze how choosing the 
transmission capacity calculation criteria would affect the Finnish power system 
transmission capacity and security margins. 
As demonstrated later in this thesis, the power import from Sweden to Finland is much 
more common than the export situations from Finland to Sweden at present. However, 
the increasing amount of wind power and the implementation of the new Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant will affect the production-consumption balance and increase the 
energy self-sufficiency in Finland. Thus, the power export situations may become more 
common in the future.  
The transmission capacity is restricted by the thermal limits of the grid components and 
power system stability. This thesis concentrates on examining the limits for voltage 
stability and damping of the electromechanical oscillations. In the Finnish power system, 
voltage stability is the transmission capacity limiting factor in the import situations and 
the damping of electromechanical oscillations in the export situations [1]. The thermal 
limits are not covered in this thesis.  
The research is limited to the transmission capacity between northern and southern 
Finland. Part of the research question is how does choosing the limit for voltage stability 
would affect the computational transmission capacity of the Finnish power system. On 
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the other hand, the impacts of applying various voltage limits on the voltage stability 
security margin are examined. Another main part of this thesis is to study the effects of 
choosing the limit for the damping of the electromechanical oscillations. Various damping 
ratios are applied in the research to examine how the transmission capacity and security 
margins of the Finnish power system are affected if the currently used damping criterion 
was changed.  
The steady-state voltage stability is studied by means of load flow calculations and the 
post-fault transient behavior of the power system is examined by dynamic analysis. A 
signal processing technology called Prony analysis is utilized in examining the damping 
of the electromechanical oscillations in this thesis. The Prony analysis is derived from 
the output of the dynamic analysis.  
The characteristics of the Nordic and Finnish power system are presented in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 gives the basics of the power system planning concentrating on the power 
system stability and security which represent the factors affecting the transmission 
capacity. Chapter 4 presents the methods of determining the transmission capacity and 
the capacity limiting factors in the Nordic power system. Furthermore, the concept of 
dynamic security assessment is explained in Chapter 5 along with the information about 
the methods and data used to carry out the research part of this thesis. The results of 
the research are presented in Chapter 6 and the findings are discussed in Chapter 7. 
Finally, the conclusions based on the findings are summarized in Chapter 8.  
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2. FINLAND AS PART OF NORDIC POWER SYS-
TEM 
Finland is part of Nordic synchronous area. In other words, the Finnish power system is 
connected with Norway, Sweden and eastern Denmark and those countries together 
form a synchronized system where a common frequency exists. Western Denmark 
belongs to Continental European power system being connected with the Nordic system 
via high voltage direct current (HVDC) connections. Thus, Western Denmark is not part 
of the Nordic synchronous area.  
The characteristics of the Nordic power system are discussed in Chapter 2.1. The 
Finnish transmission grid is described in Chapter 2.2 and the border connections 
between Finland and the neighboring countries are presented in Chapter 2.3. Chapter 
2.4 describes the relevance of ENTSO-E in relation to this thesis. 
2.1 Characteristics of the Nordic power system 
The electricity generation resources differ widely between the Nordic countries. Norway 
mainly has hydro power, whereas wind power and thermal energy are dominating in 
Denmark. Finland and Sweden have the most mixed resources [2, p. 9].  
With regard to the geographical location of the generation resources in the Nordic 
countries, hydro power is concentrated mainly in Norway but also in northern Sweden 
and Finland. Thermal power is located in Denmark and the southern parts of Finland and 
Sweden. Wind power is dominating in Denmark, particularly in western part of the 
country. [2, p. 9] However, the amount of wind power is increasing in other countries too. 
For example, according to Suomen Tuulivoimayhdistys, there are currently over 200 
wind power projects (16500 MW) in the planning stage in Finland [3].  
The yearly electricity consumption exceeds production in Finland. Thus, Finland is 
dependent on the electricity import from Sweden. Production exceeds consumption most 
of the hours of a year in Sweden and Norway whereas in Denmark there is a generation 
deficit half of the hours of a year. [4, pp. 14-17] The border connections between the 
Nordic countries are used to even out the differences in the regional consumption and 
production balance. 
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The Nordic countries are connected by alternating current (AC) and HVDC connections. 
There are also HVDC connections to countries outside the Nordic synchronous area. 
Interconnections between northern European countries are presented in Figure 2.1. The 
purple lines in Figure 2.1 are HVDC links and other colors represent AC transmission 
lines. 
The interconnection of the individual countries’ power systems into a larger system 
brings about significant benefits. A large synchronous area means improved security as 
the generation resources are dispersed geographically and the features of the resources 
vary between the subsystems. Thus, balancing power is available also during 
exceptional conditions, such as a shortage of fuel or a drought year which reduces the 
subsystems need for reserve power [2, p. 8]. The interconnected system also enables 
the common Nordic electricity market.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, there are several interconnections connecting the Nordic 
system with the neighboring power systems. The HVDC links are connecting Norway to 
the Netherlands. Sweden is connected to Germany, Poland and Lithuania. Furthermore, 
Finland is connected to Estonia and Russia. There are also several HVDC links from 
Norway, Sweden and eastern Denmark to western Denmark. [5]  A new HVDC link from 
Norway to Great Britain is currently under construction. When completed in 2021, it will 
be the longest subsea power cable in the world [6]. Another new HVDC link from Norway 
to Germany will be put into operation during 2019 [7]. The new HVDC links are also 
shown in Figure 2.1. 
5 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Nordic transmission grid and interconnections outside the synchronous 
area. Purple lines are HVDC interconnections, red lines are 380–400 kV transmission 
lines, yellow lines are 300–330 kV transmission lines and green lines are 220–275 kV 
transmission lines [8]. 
2.2 Finnish transmission grid 
The Finnish transmission grid consists of the 400 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV transmission 
lines. Fingrid operates the whole 400 kV and 200 kV networks and about half of the 110 
kV network in Finland. The other half of the 110 kV lines is owned by the regional or 
distribution network operators.  
A map of the Finnish transmission grid is presented in Figure 2.2. The amount of 220 kV 
grid marked green in Figure 2.2 is decreasing as Fingrid replaces old technology and 
increases transmission capacity. For example, a new 400 kV connection from Oulu to 
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Petäjävesi called Forest Line is being planned and will be completed by 2022. The Forest 
Line will replace the 220 kV lines in central Finland. Thus, the 220 kV network will be 
obsoleted in southern area of Oulujoki by 2022. [9, pp. 27, 43] 
The Finnish power system is connected to northern Sweden by two 400 kV AC lines 
(Petäjäskoski–Letsi and Pikkarala–Svartby). In addition, there is a weak 220 kV AC 
connection to Norway in northern Finland (Utsjoki–Varangerbotn). [10, pp. 62-63] The 
Finnish power system is also connected to southern Sweden by two HVDC 
interconnections, Fennoskan 1 and 2. Fennoskan 1 is located between Rauma and 
Dannebo and Fennoskan 2 between Rauma and Finnböle [11]. A third AC connection 
between Finland and Sweden is currently being planned with the completion scheduled 
in 2025. Similarly to the current AC lines between Finland and Sweden, the third AC 
connection will also be located in northern Finland. [9, p. 27] 
Interconnections from Finland outside the Nordic synchronous area include HVDC links 
Estlink 1 and 2 which connect the Finnish system to Estonia. Estlink connections can be 
seen as brown lines in southern Finland in Figure 2.2. There are also three 400 kV AC 
transmission lines between Finland and Vyborg, Russia [12, p. 16]. However, two of the 
Russian connections are not synchronous but direct current (DC) is used to separate the 
two asynchronous systems. A back–to–back AC–DC–AC conversion is implemented in 
Vyborg meaning that the rectifiers and inverters are located in the same substation and 
the substation is connected to the Finnish and Russian power systems by AC lines. The 
third 400 kV AC line is used to synchronize a power plant called the North West Power 
Plant near St. Petersburg to the Finnish power system. [13, p. 30] Therefore, there are 
no synchronous interconnections between Finnish and Russian power grids.  
In addition, there are 110 kV transmission lines from Imatra and Ivalo to Russia. Those 
lines can be used to connect hydro power plants located on the Russian side of the 
border to the Finnish power system [5]. However, the 110 kV connections between 
Finland and Russia are not owned by Fingrid. [13, p. 29] There is also a low capacity 
HVDC link from Naantali to Åland owned by Ålands transmission system operator 
Kraftnät Åland [5]. 
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Figure 2.2. Finnish transmission grid and the main transmission cuts. Modified from [14]. 
There are a few cross-sections in the Finnish transmission grid which may cause 
physical limitations for transmission capacity. A Cross-section means a bottleneck which 
impacts on the transmission capacity need to be studied. A term transmission cut is also 
used to refer to the bottlenecks in the grid. The most common cross-sections to be 
studied in the Finnish transmission grid are presented in Figure 2.2 and they are called 
cut P1, RAC cut and RDC cut [2, p. 10]. Cut P1 is an internal cross-section located in 
the middle of Finland. It is running from Pietarsaari via north of Iisalmi to the east. Cut 
P1 consists of four 400 kV and two 220 kV transmission lines running in the north-south 
direction. In the future, the north-south directional power transmission in cut P1 will 
RAC 
 
RDC 
 
P1 
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increase as new generation such as a substantial part of wind power and the Hanhikivi 
1 nuclear power plant will be located in northern Finland [9, pp. 21-22].  
The other two transmission cuts include the cross-border interconnections from the 
Finnish system to Sweden. The RAC cut is located in Lapland and it consists of two 400 
kV AC lines. The third AC connection to Sweden will increase the transmission capacity 
between Finland and Sweden nearly 30 per cent in 2025 [9, p. 30]. The RDC cut includes 
the Fennoskan HVDC links from southern Finland to Sweden as can be seen in Figure 
2.2. In addition to the cross-sections described above, additional cross-sections may be 
formed while needed.  
2.3 Finnish interconnections with neighboring countries 
The maximum commercial transmission capacities of the Finnish interconnections are 
presented in Table 2.1. The capacities are determined by a Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) 
method which is discussed in Chapter 4.1.  
Table 2.1 Maximum net transfer capacities of the Finnish interconnections [12]. 
Interconnection 
 
To Finland     
(MW) 
From Finland 
(MW) 
RAC 1500 1100 
Fennoskan 1 & 2  1200 1200 
Estlink 1 & 2  1016 1016 
Russia 1300 320 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, the transmission capacities of the HVDC connections 
Fennoskan and Estlink are the same for import and export. The Fennoskan 1 cable was 
damaged in 2013 and it is currently operated at reduced voltage [15]. Thus, the 
commercial transmission capacity of Fennoskan 1 is nowadays 400 MW instead of the 
nominal maximum capacity of 500 MW. The transmission capacity of Fennoskan 2 is 
800 MW. For Estlink 1, the transmission capacity is 350 MW in summer and a 15 MW 
temperature dependent overload capacity can be utilized during winter. The capacity of 
Estlink 2 is 650 MW. The additional 16 MW capacity of the Estlink connections in Table 
2.1 is due to loss power purchasing arrangements. [12] 
The AC interconnection between Finland and Sweden (RAC) has a 1500 MW capacity 
from Sweden to Finland and 1100 MW capacity from Finland to Sweden. The difference 
between RAC capacities is due to stability and reliability issues discussed more closely 
in Chapter 4.3. There is no commercially available transmission capacity between 
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Finland and Norway due to the weak connection. Instead, Finland–Norway capacity is 
taken into account in RAC capacity and it may affect that up to 120 MW [12, p. 16]. 
As described in Table 2.1, the transmission capacity from Russia to Finland is 1300 MW 
and from Finland to Russia 320 MW. The import and export capacities differ as the  back–
to–back converter station was originally built for one-way power flow from Russia to 
Finland only [13, p. 30]. Since 2014, one of the four converter units has also been able 
to export power from Finland to Russia. [16, p. 48] 
2.4 ENTSO-E 
The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) is 
an organization of 43 European Transmission system operators (TSO). ENTSO-E’s role 
is to promote the internal electricity market and transmission system development in EU. 
ENTSO-E’s legally mandated tasks include:  
 Ensuring the secure and reliable operation of the European transmission network 
 Advancing cross-border interconnection development and integration of renewa-
ble energy resources 
 Enhancing the creation of the internal electricity market 
To achieve these tasks, ENTSO-E involves in network development and publishes 
network codes, the common codes of conduct for TSOs, producers and traders. [17] 
According to ENTSO-E, the national TSO’s are facing challenges to forecast and 
manage the short-term changes in power flows themselves as the cross-border 
electricity exchange and the amount of renewable energy resources in the network are 
increasing [18, p. 5]. To solve that problem, ENTSO-E proposed establishing the 
Regional Security Coordination Initiatives which have five core services: 
 operational planning security analysis   
 coordinated capacity calculation  
 outage planning coordination   
 short- and medium-term adequacy forecasts 
 individual and common grid model delivery 
These services produce calculations and other information which can be utilized by the 
TSOs for decision-making. [18] 
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The Nordic Regional Security Coordinator (Nordic RSC) was established in 2016 [19]. It 
will offer the formerly presented five services for the Nordic TSOs. The coordinated 
capacity calculation service is the most relevant regarding this thesis. Currently, all 
Nordic TSOs are using their own criteria for transmission capacity calculation. As the 
Nordic RSC will begin to perform the capacity calculation, it would be beneficial if the 
calculation criteria could be harmonized. The goal of this thesis is to analyze how 
choosing the calculation criteria would affect the Finnish power system security margins 
and transmission capacity. 
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3. POWER SYSTEM PLANNING 
The basic principles of power system planning are defined in Nordic grid code [2], a 
document for Nordic TSOs aiming to harmonize and coordinate the Nordic grid planning 
and operation. The Nordic Grid Code consists of the Planning Code, Connection Code, 
Operational Code, and Data Exchange Code. The last two are binding agreements 
among the Nordic TSOs whereas the Planning Code and the Connection Code are 
recommendations which should be followed. The Nordic grid code was published by 
Nordel, an association of the Nordic TSOs, which was disbanded in 2009 and the tasks 
of Nordel were transferred to ENTSO-E [20]. The European-wide grid planning and 
operation is at present guided by the network codes published by ENTSO-E 
The power system planning can be divided into long- and short-term planning. Short-
term planning includes the grid building plans for about five years whereas long-term 
planning includes the general grid plan and the guideline for the grid development for 5-
15 years. Long-term power system planning also includes reliability of the system. 
Reliability consists of system security and system adequacy. System security refers to 
the ability of the power system to withstand disturbances such as the short circuit faults 
and disconnection of components. System adequacy means there is sufficient amount 
of generation and transfer capacity to meet demand. Reliability may be assessed by 
indexes covering the average fault frequencies and -durations. [10, pp. 276-277] 
The goal of power system planning is to ensure a secure and reliable infrastructure to 
connect the electricity generation and consumption. The grid investments must be 
economical and based on the reasonable needs of the users meaning that unnecessary 
investments are not allowed. In addition, the system security must be at such level that 
the ordinary faults are not causing interruptions. [10, p. 73] The electricity market law 
obligates Fingrid to publish a ten-year main grid development plan. The development 
plan is updated every second year, and it contains the description of the investments 
being planned to meet the grid development responsibilities. [9, p. 3]   
Power system planning is based on the calculations and simulations. Power flows in 
different network states are studied by load flow analysis. Power flows change depending 
on the season and the switching state of the system. Short circuit currents are calculated 
to configure the protection devices such as relays. The dynamic stability of the system 
is assessed by dynamic analysis which means simulating transient events such as 
network faults and studying if they cause instability or does the system remain stable 
12 
 
after the faults. [10, p. 76] In this chapter, a term power system stability is defined and 
the categories of stability are explained. Another aspect of power system planning, 
security, is also discussed in this chapter. 
3.1 Stability 
Power system stability means the capability of the system to maintain steady operation 
despite the faults and changes in the operation condition. The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and International Council on Large Electric Systems 
(CIGRE) defined stability in their report as follows: “Power system stability is the ability 
of an electric power system, for a given initial operating condition, to regain a state of 
operating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical disturbance, with most system 
variables bounded so that practically the entire system remains intact.” [21] Stability is a 
feature of the whole system. The power system may maintain stability despite a single 
generator losing stability and disconnecting from the grid. In addition to generators 
remaining synchronous, voltage levels and frequency must be in an acceptable level in 
a stable power system. [10, p. 216] 
A schematic illustration of power system stability is presented in Figure 3.1. Power 
system stability is divided into three main categories: rotor angle stability, frequency 
stability and voltage stability. The main stability categories in Figure 3.1 are further 
divided into sub-categories based on the magnitude and duration of the phenomenon 
being examined. The rotor angle- and voltage stability are discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of the power system stability classification [21]. 
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3.1.1 Voltage stability 
Voltage stability means the ability of a power system to maintain voltages at allowed level 
in normal operation and after a disturbance. Voltage instability means that voltage drops 
progressively in some bus in the power system. Voltage instability may lead to voltage 
collapse if the instability spreads and leads to a low-voltage profile in a larger part of the 
power system. Voltage stability and voltage drop are also associated with rotor angle 
stability. [22, p. 27]  
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, voltage stability is divided into large-disturbance and small-
disturbance stability. Large-disturbance voltage stability stands for the ability of the 
power system to maintain steady voltages after large disturbances such as short-circuit 
faults or loss of generation. Small-disturbance voltage stability means the power system 
ability to maintain steady voltages after minor changes in the system such as changes 
in the load and generation. The main reason for voltage instability is the inability of the 
power system to meet the reactive power demand. [10, p. 246], [22, p. 32] 
Another method of classifying voltage stability is based on the duration of the phenomena 
being explored. For short-term voltage stability, the time frame is several seconds and 
the analysis concerns dynamics of fast acting components such as HVDC converters. 
While exploring long-term voltage stability, the scope is in slower acting power system 
components. The time frame for long-term voltage stability is several minutes and the 
components of interest are for example tap-changing transformers and automatic 
generator control. [21, p. 1392] Long-term voltage stability analysis assumes the 
damping of power oscillations and a constant frequency in the power system [22, p. 33].  
Voltage stability analysis involves the following aspects: proximity to the voltage 
instability and mechanism of voltage instability. Proximity to instability can be measured 
for example in terms of active power flow through a critical transmission cut or load level. 
Mechanism of instability answers to questions such as how the instability occurs and 
what is the origin of instability. [22, p. 977] 
𝑃-𝑉 curve or “nose curve” of voltage stability can be drawn to illustrate the behavior of 
voltages as a function of transferred power. Figure 3.2 presents voltage in the receiving 
end of a transmission line in a function of power transferred in the line and a few tan𝜑 
values. Tan𝜑 represents a relation between reactive and active power in the receiving 
end of the transmission line. [10, p. 252] A constant power load is assumed in Figure 
3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. 𝑃-𝑉 curve. The receiving end voltage of the transmission line presented as 
a function of the power transmission and a few different tan𝜑 values. 
For a given value of active power (P), two values of voltage (V) exist in the 𝑃-𝑉 curve. 
The nose point in 𝑃-𝑉 curve is the critical point, a maximum value of active power that 
can be transferred as the power system remains stable. If the power transmission 
increases to the nose point, voltage collapse may occur and the system may lose 
stability. Thus, only the upper operating points are acceptable. In practice, the power 
system can not be operated in the point of maximum power, but a security margin is 
used to ensure a stable operation also during occasional changes in the system such as 
the disconnection of a power system component or some other fault.  
Voltage instability may cause the loss of load and tripping of transmission lines or other 
power system components which induces outages and may spread the initially local 
instability problem. HVDC links are also part of the voltage instability problem. Instability 
is typically related to the reactive power control of the converter stations and voltage 
instability of HVDC links is normally associated with the links connected to weak AC 
lines. [21, p. 1391] 
In addition to the usual cause of voltage instability, a progressive voltage drop, voltage 
rise can also cause instability. That has been demonstrated in Montreal where load 
tripping caused the transformers on-load tap changers to attempt to raise the voltages 
and restore the load power which led to voltage instability. [23, pp. 286-287] 
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3.1.2 Rotor angle stability 
Rotor angle stability means the synchronous generators’ ability to maintain synchronism 
[22, p. 18]. To retain synchronism, the generators in a synchronous power system must 
be able to return the balance between mechanical and electrical power after 
disturbances in the power system. When the balance between the electrical and 
mechanical power changes, the angular difference between the grid voltage and the 
electromotive force inside the generator also changes. Thus, a new operating point of 
the generator in 𝑃(𝛿) curve is defined by the new angular difference 𝛿 and the electrical 
power 𝑃. [10, pp. 218, 222] 
A 𝑃(𝛿) curve is presented in Figure 3.3. As can be seen in Figure 3.3, the electrical power 
of a generator is increasing as the angular difference increases. The maximum power is 
achieved when the angular difference is 90 degrees [22, p. 20]. In steady-state, the angle 
of 90 degrees also defines if the generator is stable or not. If the angle increases to over 
90 degrees, the generator loses stability. [10, p. 221] 
Figure 3.3. The 𝑃(𝛿) curve of a generator. 90 degrees is the rotor angle stability limit in 
steady-state. 
During short-term transient events, such as network faults, the angle difference can 
exceed 90° and the situation may still remain stable. However, the fault must be cleared 
sufficiently quick to prevent the generator accelerating too much due to decreased 
electrical power during the fault. [10, pp. 230-233] 
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The change in the electrical torque of a synchronous machine ∆𝑇𝑒 after a fault can be 
divided into synchronizing torque component 𝑇𝑆∆𝛿 and damping torque 
component 𝑇𝐷∆𝜔. The relations between these torque components can be presented as: 
       ∆𝑇𝑒 = 𝑇𝑆∆𝛿 + 𝑇𝐷∆𝜔                           (3.1) 
Where 𝑇𝑆 is the synchronizing torque coefficient, ∆𝛿 is the rotor angle shift, 𝑇𝐷  is the 
damping torque coefficient and ∆𝜔 is the angular speed deviation [22, p. 23]. In order for 
the generator retaining stability, both of the torque components must be at a sufficient 
level. If a synchronous generator loses stability, it must be disconnected from the grid in 
order for the other generators being able to continue stable operation [10, p. 218]. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, rotor angle stability is divided into two sub-categories: 
small-disturbance angle stability (or steady-state stability) and transient stability. Small-
disturbance stability means the power system ability to maintain stability in small 
disturbances, such as changes in load and generation. The forms of instability that may 
occur are [22, p. 23]:  
1. Continuous increase of the rotor angle due to insufficient synchronizing torque 
(Figure 3.4 b) 
2. Rotor angle oscillations of increasing amplitude due to insufficient damping 
torque (Figure 3.4 c) 
The second form of instability, oscillation of increasing amplitude, is more common [24].  
Transient stability means the power system ability to retain synchronism after a serious 
transient disturbance such as a short circuit fault. The resulting forms of instability are 
the same as above. The form of instability caused by insufficient synchronizing torque is 
called the first-swing instability. However, transient instability may not necessarily occur 
at the first swing, but in large power systems the rotor angle may make large excursions 
after the first swing too. [22, pp. 25-26] In transient stability studies, the dynamic behavior 
of the power system is usually simulated approximately 20 seconds after the beginning 
of the studied fault [10, p. 228].    
The consequences of the relations between the torque components are illustrated in 
Figure 3.4. In Figure 3.4 a) both the synchronizing and damping torque components are 
at sufficient level and the oscillation dampens. In Figure 3.4 b) the synchronizing torque 
component is insufficient which leads to the continuous increase of the rotor angle and 
in Figure 3.4 c) the damping torque component is insufficient leading to the oscillation of 
increasing amplitude. 
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Figure 3.4. a) Damping oscillation, stability remains b) continuously increasing rotor 
angle, instability due to insufficient synchronizing torque c) the rotor angle oscillation of 
increasing amplitude, instability due to insufficient damping torque. 
The electromechanical oscillations caused by the insufficient damping torque can be 
observed in many quantities such as power flows, generator speeds and voltage 
magnitudes. The damping of the oscillations is the power transmission limiting factor 
during high power flow from a small power system to a larger one. [25] The oscillations 
must be able to damped out to prevent them causing instability. 
The electromechanical oscillation modes can be classified into the local modes, inter- 
area modes, control modes and torsional modes. The local modes appear in frequencies 
from 0.7 to 2 Hz and they are associated with a single generator or a power plant 
oscillating against the rest of the system. The inter-area modes are present while many 
generators in one part of the power system oscillate against the generators in other parts 
of the system. The frequency range of the inter-area mode is from 0.1 to 0.7 Hz. The 
control modes are associated with the generator control systems and torsional modes 
are caused by the turbine-generator shaft systems interacting with the control systems. 
[22, pp. 25, 817-818] 
3.2 Security and N-1 criterion 
The transmission grid security of supply must be at the high level. Therefore, meshed 
structure is used in transmission grid design to ensure an alternative route for power flow 
in case some grid component gets faulted or there is a planned outage in the grid. Unlike 
in the radial distribution grid, a fault in the meshed transmission grid does not cause an 
outage. [10, p. 271] For example, the transmission reliability of Fingrid was 99.9999 
percent of the transferred energy in 2018 [26].    
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An N-1 criterion is applied in the transmission grid design and operation. The N-1 
criterion means that the power system must withstand the loss of any single component 
such as the power line, transformer, generation unit or bus bar. The fault which has the 
largest impact on the power system is called a dimensioning fault. The dimensioning fault 
is usually the disconnection of the largest production unit in the system. Another possible 
dimensioning faults in the Finnish system may be faults in the substations and the inter-
area lines. [2, p. 67] 
According to the Nordic Grid Code, a dimensioning fault in a subsystem, such as the 
Finnish power system, is not allowed to cause serious disturbances in other subsystems 
in the Nordic synchronous area [2, p. 67]. The maximum transmission capacity of the 
transmission grid is restricted by the dimensioning fault. One consequence of the N-1 
criterion is that the transmission capacity of the system is not the sum of the capacities 
of the individual lines. If one transmission line is disconnected, the remaining lines must 
be able to transfer the power flow of the disconnected line. [10, p. 279] 
The operational states of the power system are defined in the Nordic grid code. In the 
normal state, the frequency, voltage and power transmission are within the acceptable 
limits, consumption requirements are being met and reserve requirements are fulfilled. 
The power system is prepared to handle a dimensioning fault in the normal state. In the 
alert state the reserve requirements are not fulfilled and faults in the grid components or 
generation disconnection will lead to the disturbed state or the emergency state. [2, p. 
59] According to the Nordic grid code, the power system must be restored to normal 
state within 15 minutes after a disturbance [2, p. 67]. In other words, after a fault, the 
power system must be in 15 minutes in a state it withstands a dimensioning fault again.  
The disturbed state means that the frequency, voltage and power transmission are not 
at the acceptable level, and it is not possible to restore the power system to the normal 
state in 15 minutes. In the emergency state, the compulsory load shedding has been 
applied. Production disconnection may occur and the network may split into islands. In 
addition, the fifth operation state, network collapse, has been defined. It means that all 
loads in one or more areas are shed and production disconnection and islanding can 
occur. [2, p. 62] 
In the security criteria, acceptable consequences are determined for various 
combinations of operating situations and faults. More severe consequences can be 
allowed for the less common faults. In the Nordic grid code, the faults are divided into 
groups FG1-FG5 with regard to their prevalence. The FG1 and FG2 faults are the most 
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frequent single faults such as the loss of a generation unit or a transmission line. The 
FG3 faults are less frequent single faults and the more common double faults. The 
groups FG4 and FG5 consist of rare faults like the combinations of simultaneous faults. 
The faults in FG1-FG3 are N-1 faults, i.e. they are considered as dimensioning faults. [2, 
pp. 23-27] 
The assessment of power system security is done by dynamic and steady-state analysis. 
Security during a disturbance is assessed by dynamic simulations, which examine if the 
system remains stable or is the disturbance causing the system to collapse. The voltage 
levels and power flows are examined in steady-state analysis, which means load-flow 
calculations after the post-fault oscillations have damped. [10, p. 280] 
The security of a power system depends on the operation mode, i.e. the same fault may 
cause different consequences depending on the switching and transmission state of the 
system. Other factors influencing the power system operation mode are the load flow, 
amount and location of loads and generation and the types of generators connected to 
the grid. [10, p. 280] For example, the nuclear units’ yearly revisions are typically taking 
place in summer whereas in winter their large synchronous generators are in full 
operation and able to contribute to power system control and operation. On the other 
hand, the largest river flows are usually in the spring due to floods. Thus, the peak in 
hydropower production usually takes place in the spring. Furthermore, the combined 
heat and power production is at its peak in winter due to the increased heat power 
demand. 
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4. DETERMINING THE TRANSMISSION CAPAC-
ITY 
This chapter defines a term transmission capacity and explains the transmission capacity 
limitations of the AC transmission systems. Practices of determining the transmission 
capacity in Nordic countries are also described in this chapter. 
There are many subterms related to the term transmission capacity discussed later in 
this chapter but in general transmission capacity means the maximum power flow that 
the power system is able to transfer while the security criteria are conformed. 
Transmission capacity can be reviewed in terms of a single line, transmission cut or 
subsystem. 
Currently, Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) method is used by Fingrid to calculate cross-
zonal transmission capacities. However, according to The Guideline on Capacity 
Allocation and Congestion Management by ENTSO-E, so called Flow-Based (FB) 
approach should be used as the primary capacity calculation method [27]. The capacity 
calculation methods are explained in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. 
4.1 Net Transfer Capacity 
The Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) method is based on calculating the Total Transfer 
Capacity (TTC) first. The TTC represents the maximum amount of active power that can 
be transferred through a chosen boundary while the power system security criteria are 
taken into account. [12]  A term grid transfer capability is also used by some sources [28, 
pp. 22-23]. The TTC is a technical maximum transmission capacity which is limited by 
the reliability and security criteria described in Chapter 3. The TTC is dependent on the 
state of the power system, such as which generators are in operation, the amount of load 
and generation, or possible power line outages in the system. 
Part of the TTC is reserved for Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM). The TRM is a 
security margin which covers the TTC calculation errors and inaccuracies. The TRM 
takes into account the following sources of uncertainty: [1] 
 Variations in power flows caused by automatically activated reserves 
 Variations in power flows due to unanticipated variations in electricity 
consumption and production 
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 Inaccuracies in measurements and data collection  
The TRM values are different for each connection, and they are defined based on the 
TSO experts’ estimations. For example, the TRM for AC connection between Finland 
and Sweden is 100 MW. For DC connections, the TRM is 0 MW. [12] 
When the TRM is subtracted from the TTC, the remaining capacity is called Net Transfer 
Capacity (NTC). The NTC is the commercial capacity offered to the electricity market. 
[12] In the market point of view, the NTC is the maximum power flow between two bidding 
zones when the technical limits and requirements of TSOs have been taken into account 
[28]. The relations between previously explained transmission capacity terms can be 
presented as:   
NTC =  TTC – TRM      (4.1) 
The factors defining TTC are explained in Chapter 4.4.  
4.2 Flow-based method 
The physical limits of the power system transmission capacity affect the price formation 
in the electricity market. To more accurately define the physical limits and inter-area 
power flows, a Flow Based capacity calculation method has been introduced. The current 
Nordic NTC method simplifies the transmission situation as it does not take into account 
that there is often more than one route for the power flow. For example, if power 
transmission between two areas increases, increased power flow in only one 
interconnection is assumed by the NTC method whereas in the FB method the increased 
power flow is divided into all the inter-area connections as in reality happens. [29, pp. 
24-25] 
The previously explained drawback of the NTC method concerns especially the systems 
which include several inter-area connections. In the Nordic system, there are several 
cross-border AC interconnections between Sweden and Norway. However, the AC 
connections between Finland and other Nordic countries are limited to the RAC cut. 
Therefore, the NTC method represents the cross-border power flow quite well in Finland 
but the implementation of the FB method may be necessary to constitute a common 
Nordic capacity calculation method. 
In the FB method, the market capacity is limited by two factors, Power Transfer 
Distribution Factors (PTDF) and Remaining Available Margins (RAM). RAMs represent 
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the capacity allocated to the electricity market in megawatts. The PTDFs illustrate how 
much power flow is increased in the inter-area connections by one megawatt increase in 
generation in a specific area. [29, pp. 26-28] In other words, the PTDFs represent how 
the power flows caused by changing generation or load are distributed in the 
transmission grid. Thus, the actual power flows can be better represented in the FB 
method than in the NTC method which may lead to better utilization of the transmission 
capacity and avoid unnecessary capacity limitations.  
In the FB method, the term maximum flow Fmax corresponds to the TTC in the NTC 
method. Fmax is the maximum power flow taking into account the technical limits of the 
power system. Similarly, Flow Reliability Margin (FRM) as a term corresponds to the 
TRM in the NTC method. The RAM is calculated from the sum of the technical margins. 
[29, p. 45] The PTDFs and RAMs jointly form a set of parameters which describe the 
available transmission capacity between areas or bidding zones. [29, p. 42] 
4.3 Transmission capacity limitations 
In addition to N-1 criteria, the transmission capacity is limited by thermal- voltage- and 
rotor angle stability limitations. The thermal limitations mean the maximum current the 
transmission lines can conduct without violating safety rules or damaging the grid 
components. [12, p. 7] The higher current, the more the temperatures of the lines rise. 
High temperature causes the thermal expansion of the conductors which, for example, 
increases the sag of the transmission lines and may cause the lines to hang dangerously 
low. The transmission capacity of a short line is usually restricted by thermal limitations 
[10, p. 220]. The transmission capacity of the HVDC links is also restricted by thermal 
limitations but the effect of the HVDC link disconnection on the power system stability 
must be taken into account too [10, pp. 297-298]. The disconnection of an HVDC link 
may be a dimensioning fault in some conditions. 
Voltage stability or rotor angle stability are usually the limiting factors regarding power 
transmission in the Nordic power system due to long transmission distances and high 
reactances in the grid. Thus, the transmission capacity between the Nordic countries is 
generally lower than what is the grid components’ thermal capacity. Furthermore, the 
transmission capacity of some interconnections varies depending on the direction of the 
power flow or time of the year. [2, p. 9] 
Voltage limitations mean that voltages must be within the defined minimum and 
maximum limits. The aim of the maximum voltage limit is to prevent damaging or 
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premature aging of grid components due to high voltage. The minimum voltage limit is 
set to prevent the individual faults from causing a collapse of the interconnected system 
voltage which could lead to a blackout of the whole system. [12, p. 7] 
Both steady-state voltage stability and transient voltage stability must be studied to 
determine the transmission capacity. Steady-state voltage stability means that voltages 
must be within allowed limits after the immediate post-fault oscillations have damped. 
Transient voltage stability means that the momentary voltage is not allowed to drop 
below a predefined limit during post-fault power oscillations. Voltage stability has been 
traditionally considered as a transmission capacity limiting factor in network areas where 
only a few or not any synchronous generators exist and power is transferred to the area 
from elsewhere. The reason for that is the dependency between voltage and reactive 
power. The less there are reactive power supplying resources in a specific area, the 
easier voltage stability may be lost after the disturbances. [10, p. 246] 
Rotor angle stability limitations are associated with the requirement of the power system 
to withstand transient events also after a disturbance. The post-fault rotor angle 
oscillations of the synchronous generators cause power-, voltage-, and frequency 
oscillations in the power system. The synchronous generators’ oscillations with respect 
to one another must be damped after a disturbance to return the system to a stable 
operating point. If the stable operation can not be quickly returned, synchronization 
between generators may be lost and the whole interconnected power system may 
become unstable which could lead to a blackout. [12, p. 8] 
When power is exported from Finland to Sweden, i.e. power flows through cut P1 from 
southern Finland to northern Finland and onward towards southern Sweden through 
RAC cut, the transmission capacity is restricted by post-fault power oscillation 
requirements [1]. This is illustrated in the upper left corner of Figure 4.1. The oscillations 
must be damped in an adequate time frame in order for the system retaining stability. 
The insufficient damping of the inter-area oscillations is the limiting factor especially as 
the power surplus is located in southern Finland and power is transferred to southern 
parts of Sweden and Norway, the transmission distance being about 2000 kilometers 
[30].  
When power is imported from Sweden to Finland, i.e. power flows through RAC cut from 
Sweden to Finland and onward to southern Finland through cut P1, the transmission 
capacity is restricted by voltage limitations and the permissible loading of the 
transmission lines [1]. That is illustrated in the down right corner of Figure 4.1. The 
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dimensioning fault during import situation is the disconnection of the largest generation 
unit in the Finnish system. The larger the disconnected unit is, the greater oscillations 
are caused by the disconnection and the transmission capacity is limited by transient 
voltage stability. If the disconnected generation unit is small, the transmission capacity 
is mainly limited by steady-state voltage stability as only minor voltage dips associated 
with power oscillations are resulting from the disconnection. [31, p. 176] 
The damping issues during the north to south directional power flow were managed in 
the 1960s by building new power lines, equipping generators with the power system 
stabilizers and installing series compensators on long power lines. [32, p. 7] Thus, the 
damping of the power oscillations is usually not the transmission capacity limiting factor 
when power flows from Sweden to Finland as the power surplus is located in northern 
Sweden and the transmission distance to southern Finland is in that case about 1000 
kilometers [30].  
 
Figure 4.1. The Finnish power system operating range diagram [1]. 
The horizontal and vertical lines in Figure 4.1 illustrate the defined transmission 
capacities. The diagonal lines are limits which are not normally exceeded, even though 
the transmission capacity would allow it. In order to get to the upper right corner, i.e. high 
import from Sweden to Finland and simultaneously a huge P1 transmission from south 
to north, the major part of the load should be located in northern Finland. On the other 
hand, there should be lots of generation in northern Finland to cross the down left 
diagonal limit. In practice, exceeding the diagonal limits is not possible in normal 
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operation considering the geographical distribution of the loads and generation in 
Finland. 
4.4 Criteria for transmission capacity calculation 
There are three factors studied by load flow calculations and dynamic simulations while 
determining the transmission capacity in the Nordic countries. The thermal limitations or 
loadability of the grid components is the first one but as stated in Chapter 4.3, rotor angle- 
and voltage stability are usually the more limiting factors in the Nordic power system. 
Therefore, this thesis is concentrated on studying the voltage stability and power 
oscillation damping criteria.     
The damping of the oscillation amplitude can be presented as: 
                                                    𝐴 = 𝐴0e
−𝑡/𝜏sin(2𝜋𝑓𝑡)                                           (4.2) 
where 𝐴 is the oscillation amplitude, 𝐴0 is the initial amplitude, 𝑡 is time, 𝜏 is the time 
constant of damping and f is the oscillation frequency. The power oscillation of only one 
frequency is assumed in equation 4.2 to simplify the calculation. In reality, power 
oscillation is a combination of different frequencies which have different damping ratios. 
In the Nordic power system, the 0.3 Hz inter-area oscillation is dominating and 
simultaneously it is the worst regarding damping. [31, p. 176] During the 0.3 Hz 
oscillation, the generators in southern Finland oscillate against the generators in 
southern Sweden and Norway. The 0.3 Hz oscillation mode is usually present when 
power is transferred from southern Finland through P1 and RAC cuts to southern 
Sweden. Another main oscillation mode in the Nordic system is 0.5 Hz which occurs also 
when power is exported from Finland to Sweden. The 0.5 Hz oscillation is observable 
especially in Norway and Sweden. [33] 
Concerning the power oscillations, there are three common methods of assessing 
damping. The first method of defining a damping criterion is to set an upper limit for the 
time constant of damping 𝜏. Another method is to set a lower limit for the damping ratio 
𝜁 which can be presented as:   
                                                           𝜁 =
1
2𝜋𝑓𝜏
.                                                        (4.3) 
Where 𝑓 is frequency and 𝜏 is the time constant of damping. The third method of defining 
the damping criterion is to set a lower limit for the decreasing of the oscillation amplitude 
in a certain time. [31, p. 177] That is illustrated in Figure 4.2 which presents the 
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decreasing of the oscillation amplitude in about five swing periods. The situation in Figure 
4.2 is considered stable if after 20 seconds the oscillation amplitude has decreased to 
under 90 % of the first swing amplitude. 
 
Figure 4.2. Damping criterion used by Fingrid. Power oscillation must be damped at 
least 10 % in 20 seconds. 
According to Ruhle, a damping ratio lower than 3 % is usually considered as too weak 
damping whereas at least 5 % damping ratio is adequate. However, the minimum 
acceptable level for damping can not be unambiguously defined. [34] The adequate 
damping is system-specific. The stability assessment of Finnish transmission grid was 
studied in [35]. In the study, 3-5 % was considered as reasonable damping and 3 % 
damping was defined as a security criterion.  
The basic principle of assessing the voltage stability is to find out if the studied operating 
condition is acceptable in relation to the 𝑃-𝑉 curve presented in Chapter 3.1.1. In 
addition, a security margin is needed to ensure that voltage stability remains after the 
contingencies too. Different methods of defining the voltage stability criteria are used but 
in general all of them are aiming to keep a certain margin from the nose point of the 𝑃-𝑉 
curve in all operation conditions. Different variables such as total load in an area, power 
transfer through a certain crosscut, reactive power reserves or bus voltages may be used 
to define a criterion for voltage stability. [36]  
For reactive power reserves, a minimum limit can be set, i.e. the reserves must remain 
above the certain percent of their reactive power output to ensure voltage stability under 
all contingencies [36]. However, bus voltage limits are used in Nordic countries to assess 
voltage stability. One method is to set a lower limit for bus voltages which defines the 
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lowest acceptable voltage considered stable. Another method is to define the upper and 
lower limits which create a range for stable operation.  
The voltage limits define a stable operating point, a certain power transmission, in the 𝑃-
𝑉 curve. However, while being near the tip point of the nose curve, voltage may decrease 
heavily even though the power transmission increases only slightly. Thus, an extra 
security margin can be utilized to ensure an adequate margin between the obtained 
transfer limit and the power transmission leading to voltage collapse after a dimensioning 
fault. [31, p. 174] In practice, the security margin means reducing the maximum transfer 
limit by a certain, predefined amount.   
The basics of defining the transmission capacity utilizing voltage stability criterion are 
presented by means of 𝑃-𝑉 curves in Figure 4.3. The pre-contingency curve illustrates 
the condition before the fault. In the point A, the margin to the voltage collapse point is 
adequate. However, the condition drops to point B in the post-contingency curve after 
the fault and then the margin to the voltage collapse point is considerably smaller. In 
other words, points A and B define the last stable transmission level. To ensure the 
security during occasional fluctuations in the system, a security margin is utilized. Thus, 
the final transmission capacity is the power transmission determined by points C and D. 
 
Figure 4.3. Defining the transmission capacity utilizing the voltage stability criteria. 
Points A and B determine the last acceptable transmission level. Points C and D deter-
mine the final transmission capacity after the reduction of the security margin. 
Fingrid’s current criteria for voltage stability are defined as the lowest acceptable 
voltages. The lowest acceptable voltage in steady-state after a fault in 400 kV network 
is 370 kV which corresponds to 0.925 pu. The lowest acceptable momentary voltage 
during post-fault oscillation is 320 kV corresponding to 0.8 pu. [37] To evaluate the power 
28 
 
oscillations impact on the transmission capacity, the third method presented above is 
used by Fingrid. The oscillations must be damped at least 10 percent within 20 seconds 
after a fault which corresponds to 3-5 swing periods as described in Figure 4.2. In 
addition, 200 MW security margin is decreased from the achieved capacity. The 200 MW 
margin covers the inaccuracy of the calculation and it is not the same as the TRM [31, 
p. 177]. 
In [38], a transmission capacity calculation method was studied. In the study, a limit for 
voltage stability was defined as 15 % security margin from 𝑃-𝑉 curve nose point. More 
accurately, 15 % margin was defined as minimum and it was not necessary to calculate 
the exact nose point for every studied case. Instead, the active power in the receiving 
end bus was increased to P/0.85 where P is the maximum load power as none of the 
security constraints are exceeded. If voltage collapse did not occur and the power flow 
calculation converged after increasing the load power, the voltage stability margin was 
considered at least 15 %. If the voltage collapse occurred, the actual nose point was 
solved and the resulting maximum transfer capacity was reduced by 15 % margin. For 
rotor angle stability, a limit of 45 degree difference from a reference value was used in 
the study. [38] In [39], the same constraints as above were utilized in another 
transmission capacity calculation study.  
Tidal energy resources integration in Oregon, United States, was studied in [40] and a 
case study of the power system security was conducted. In the study, the security 
criterion for the steady-state voltage was defined so that the voltage deviations were not 
allowed to exceed 7 % after a single contingency. Concerning transient security, voltage 
dip was not allowed to exceed 20 % for more than 20 cycles at load buses. Furthermore, 
the condition must remain stable after all the applied contingencies. These criteria were 
stated to comply with the practices specified by the local United States authorities. [40, 
p. 148] 
The tidal energy integration in the Republic of Korea was studied in [40] too. In that case, 
the voltage security criteria were defined as follows: Voltage magnitude range after the 
disturbance was limited to 0.9 – 1.1 pu, post-contingency voltage deviation was not 
allowed to exceed 6 % and voltage stability margin must be at least 5 %. Regarding 
transient security, voltage dip was not allowed to exceed 20 % for more than 20 cycles 
to prevent the disconnection of the tidal energy resources causing a risk for the grids 
security and 3 % was defined as the minimum damping ratio for the electromechanical 
oscillations. [40, pp. 42, 160] 
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5. RESEARCH AND SIMULATION METHODS 
The power system security is studied by computational methods. Investigating the power 
system’s pre- and post-contingency transient and steady-state behavior is called 
dynamic security assessment (DSA). The concept of DSA is described in Chapter 5.1. 
In this thesis, the power system is studied by simulations utilizing PSS/E (Power System 
Simulator for Engineering) software. The simulation software and used calculation 
methods are presented in more detail in Chapter 5.2. 
The studied transmission capacity calculation criteria are described in Chapter 5.3. The 
simulations are based on the real operating conditions of the Finnish power system, and 
the cases used in the research were chosen among the real network data and 
measurements. The cases were chosen so that they represent a diverse collection of 
network conditions to ensure an extensive investigation of the Finnish power system 
transmission capacity. The cases used in the study are presented in Chapter 5.4. 
5.1 Dynamic security assessment 
In addition to the requirement of the power system to fulfill the stability criteria, it must 
also remain security after the disturbances. Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA) means 
investigating the transient behavior of the power system after the contingencies, whereas 
investigating the static behavior of the system after the post contingency fluctuations 
have been settled is referred to as Static Security Assessment (SSA). However, DSA is 
often used to refer to both of the previously explained terms. [41, pp. 256-257] 
DSA can be performed off-line or online. Off-line DSA means using the model of a 
specific system condition to analyze the power system operation. In online DSA, real-
time data is used to investigate the present system operation. DSA includes three 
phases: defining the system security criteria and contingencies to be applied, building 
the system models and completing the analysis. In this thesis, the interest is in voltage 
stability and damping of electromechanical oscillations. Other factors analyzed by DSA 
are, for example, the thermal loading and frequency stability. [41, pp. 256-258] 
Transmission capacity is traditionally analyzed by off-line DSA. The analysis starts by 
determining if the investigated system condition fulfills the security criteria after a 
contingency is applied and if not, which criterion is not fulfilled and which contingency 
causes the security criteria violation. The initial condition of the analysis is called a base 
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case. If all the security criteria are fulfilled in the base case, the power flow is increased 
by adjusting some power system variable, such as load or generation, until the security 
criteria violation occurs. The maximum transmission capacity is the greatest power flow 
at which no security limits are exceeded after a contingency. [41, p. 265] In this thesis, 
the power transmission in the cut P1 is increased by shifting loads between southern 
and northern Finland whereas the full capacity of RAC cut is used in all the simulated 
situations.  
Various methods of performing DSA exist such as power flow analysis, PV analysis, 
time-domain simulations and eigenvalue analysis. The used method depends on the 
studied feature. [41, pp. 258-264] Power flow analysis can be used to evaluate voltage 
stability by creating 𝑃-𝑉 curves, eigenvalues are exploited to investigate 
electromechanical oscillation and the time domain simulations are used to assess the 
transient security of the power system [42]. Power flow analysis and time-domain 
simulations are utilized in this thesis to examine the static and dynamic behavior of the 
Finnish power system.  
5.2 Calculation methods and network model 
The calculations and simulations of this thesis are performed using PSS/E transmission 
planning and analysis software. The PV analysis feature of PSS/E is used to form the 𝑃-
𝑉 curves which are exploited to analyze the steady-state voltage stability. The PV 
analysis tool plots the 𝑃-𝑉 curves during different contingencies for the monitored buses. 
The weakest bus in each case can easily be determined from the output of the PV 
analysis. 
The power flow calculations are utilized in steady-state analysis. The power flow is 
solved by iterating the network equations. Full Newton-Raphson and Fixed-slope 
decoupled Newton-Raphson iteration algorithms are used in this thesis. The iteration 
ends when the calculation reaches the defined tolerance. Usually, the tolerance is 
reached in 2-5 iterations [10, p. 151]. If the tolerance is not reached in the predefined 
number of iterations, the calculation is terminated and the mismatch describes how far 
the convergence is or how unreliable the result is. The power flow calculations define the 
condition of the power system in steady-state, for example after the contingencies. 
However, the power flow calculations are not giving any information about how the 
condition is achieved but only the end situation is presented.    
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The dynamic simulations are utilized to gather more accurate information about the 
behavior of the power system. The dynamic simulations describe the behavior of the 
power system in a function of time. A disturbance in the power system causes a transient 
phenomenon. The quantities of the power system such as power flows, voltages and 
frequency may oscillate during the transient phenomenon which can lead to instability. 
[10, p. 76] The power flow solution is not giving any information about the transient 
phenomenon. In this thesis, the dynamic simulations are used to verify the power flow 
calculations and examine the damping of oscillations. The dynamic analysis is based on 
a solved power flow case. 
In this thesis, the damping of electromechanical oscillations is studied by a signal 
processing technology called Prony’s method or Prony analysis. The Prony’s method 
estimates various quantities in the studied signal, such as frequency and damping of the 
oscillation modes. The method fits a discrete linear prediction model to the studied signal. 
Then, the roots of the characteristical equation of the model are found and the amplitude 
and phase of each mode in the signal are determined. [43] In practice, the Prony’s 
method fits different frequency signals to the inspected curve to find out the dominant 
oscillation modes. The interest is in 0.3 Hz oscillations because it is the dominant inter- 
area mode in the Nordic power system as described in Chapter 4.4. The damping ratio 
of the 0.3 Hz mode is derived from the dynamic simulations utilizing the Prony analysis. 
The network model of the whole synchronous system is needed in the dynamic 
simulations. Thus, the Nordic network model is used in the simulations of this thesis. The 
Nordic planning model has been made for both low and high load scenarios as the 
generation resources and loads differ depending on the season of the year. In this thesis, 
the high load model is used in the winter situations and the low load model in the summer 
situations. Winter is defined to be from October to March and summer from April to 
September.  
The latest available model of the Nordic power system is used in this thesis. In addition, 
the real-time situation of the Finnish power system is updated to the model. The real-
time situation is based on the measurement data. The loads in the Nordic planning model 
are modelled as constant power loads for the power flow calculations. For dynamic 
analysis, the loads are converted to the combinations of the constant power-, constant 
current- and constant impedance loads. 
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5.3 Transmission capacity calculation criteria to be examined 
Fingrid’s currently used criteria for transmission capacity calculation were discussed in 
Chapter 4.4. The objective of this thesis is to study how the calculated transmission 
capacity and security margins of the Finnish power system would be affected if different 
criteria were used.   
As described in previous chapters, the transmission capacity of the Finnish and Nordic 
power system is mainly limited by voltage stability and electromechanical oscillation 
damping issues. Therefore, the voltage and damping criteria are studied in this thesis. 
The minimum damping ratio is a commonly used criterion for assessing the 
electromechanical oscillations. As presented in Chapter 4.4, damping ratios of 3 % and 
5 % are often considered as adequate damping. Therefore, the effects that applying 
damping ratios nearby 3 % and 5 % would have on the Finnish power system are 
investigated here. The exact damping criteria studied in this thesis are presented in Table 
5.1. The 3 % damping ratio is the lowest criterion studied in this thesis because it is often 
considered as the lowest limit for stable operation as described in Chapter 4.4. 
The post-contingency voltage limits are defined based on the TSOs experience of the 
system operation. It may be possible to adjust the limits especially as the power system 
develops. Currently, the steady-state minimum voltage limit used by Fingrid is 0.925 pu 
corresponding to 370 kV. Reducing the voltage limit to 0.9 pu was studied in [44]. It was 
concluded in the study that despite applying the higher limit would increase the 
transmission capacity, the current limit should be retained for now as reducing the limit 
would decrease the voltage stability security margin. However, re-assessment of 
reducing the voltage limit was suggested as the security margin was predicted to be 
higher in the future due to upcoming changes in the Finnish power system such as new 
transmission lines and increasing number of generation resources. The voltage limits 
studied in this thesis are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Calculation criteria studied in this thesis 
Damping 
criterion 
(minimum damping 
ratio) 
6 % 5 % 4 % 3 % 
Steady-state 
voltage 
criterion 
(minimum post-con-
tingency residual 
voltage) 
370 kV 
(0.9250 pu) 
365 kV 
(0.9125 pu) 
360 kV 
(0.900 pu) 
355 kV 
(0.8875 pu) 
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5.4 Base cases  
As described in Chapter 3.2, the state of the power system varies depending on, for 
example, the season of the year or time of the day. Thus, the base cases used in the 
research were chosen so that they represent different operating situations. Regarding 
power transmission in cut P1, power is normally imported from Sweden to Finland during 
the north to south directional power flow. When power flows from south to north in cut 
P1, export to Sweden normally occurs for some extent. Basically, the import situations 
exist during the daytime as the load demand is high in the Finnish power system whereas 
the export situations take place during the nighttime when the load decreases.  
The duration curves of the power transmission in cut P1 for the years 2015-2018 are 
presented in Figure 5.1. As shown in Figure 5.1, the import situations are much more 
common. The export hours have increased in later years but still they only comprise 
roughly 20 percent of the hours in 2018.  
According to Finnish Meteorological Institute, the year 2018 was exceptionally dry and 
warm, whereas the year 2017 was rainier than the average year. The year 2016 was 
warmer than average and the rainfall was higher than average in winter and summer, 
the autumn and spring being dry. The year 2015 was record-breaking warm and the 
rainfall fluctuated around the country. [45]  
Regarding the development of the generation portfolio in Finland during the years 2015-
2018, the installed wind power capacity was approximately 1000 MW in 2015 whereas 
in 2017 the amount of wind power had increased to over 2000 MW. In 2018, new wind 
power capacity was not installed. On the other hand, the condensate power capacity 
decreased from 1600 MW in 2015 to about 1000 MW in 2016 remaining at that level also 
in 2017 and 2018. [46] 
According to Figure 5.1, the highest power flow in cut P1 has been approximately 2600 
MW in the north to south direction and 1700 MW in the south to north direction in the 
years 2015-2018. While choosing the base cases for the simulations among the import 
and export situations, the initial power flow in cut P1 was tried to maximize in order to 
avoid the need for excessively adjusting the base cases to reach the transmission limits. 
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Figure 5.1 Duration curves of power transmission in cut P1 in 2015-2018. Positive val-
ues in the power transmission axis represent import situations and negative values ex-
port situations. 
The Finnish power system real-time data of the base cases is from the years 2018 and 
2019 because the Finnish transmission grid has been in such form as it is at present 
since 2018. The base cases presented in Table 5.2 are named based on their 
characteristic features. The more accurate information about the base cases including 
the border transfers and loads in the Finnish power system is presented in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.2. Base cases for the simulations. The date and time of the Finnish power 
system real-time data are inside the braces. 
Import Export 
Summer (29.5.2018 19–20) Summer 1 (25.6.2018 03–04) 
Winter (23.11.2018 17–18) Summer 2 (30.8.2018 02–03) 
Wind power peak production 
(27.9.2018 11–12) 
Winter 1 (10.2.2019 04–05) 
Hydro power peak production 
(4.5.2018 13–14) 
Winter 2 (17.1.2019 03–04) 
Power line outage 1  
(28.3.2019 10–11) 
Power line outage  
(26.2.2019 03–04) 
Power line outage 2 
 (27.2.2019 09–10) 
Wind power peak production 
(17.2.2019 03–04) 
The summer base cases in Table 5.2 are low load conditions, the summer 1 being a 
Midsummer night export situation. The summer 2 base case is a rare situation in which 
export to Sweden occurs in both AC and DC connections between Finland and Sweden. 
In the real-time data of the other export base cases, power is exported from Finland to 
Sweden only in the northern AC lines and the Fennoskan HVDC links are set at the 
export mode manually before the simulations. The winter cases are high load conditions 
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whereas the wind- and hydro power peak production cases are conditions in which the 
generation of the corresponding resource is at its peak. In the power line outage and 
power line outage 1 cases one transmission line is out of service in the Finnish power 
system, whereas in the power line outage 2 case, two transmission lines are out of 
service.  
The contingencies applied in the simulations are the fault of the largest generation unit 
in the Finnish power system in the import situations and the fault of the largest HVDC 
link in the export situations. The faults result in the disconnection of the faulty power 
system component. Both of the contingencies are classified as N-1 conditions, the 
disconnection of the largest generation unit belonging to FG1 and the disconnection of 
the internal Nordic HVDC link belonging to FG2 [2, p. 27]. 
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6. RESULTS 
The results of the simulations are presented in this chapter. Firstly, the import situations 
are discussed in Chapter 6.1. The simulation results of the import situations are 
presented in pairs such as summer and winter, wind and hydro power and the power line 
outages. The results of the steady-state PV analysis are shown as 𝑃-𝑉 curves and the 
graphs of dynamic analysis illustrate the dynamic behavior of the power system during 
the post-contingency transient event. 
The export situations are treated in Chapter 6.2. The export base cases are introduced 
first. Then, the results of the damping studies are presented in a form of a table as only 
the P1 power flows associated with each damping criterion were solved in the 
simulations of the export situations.  
6.1 Import situations 
The largest generation unit in the Finnish power system will be the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear 
power plant (OL3). The disconnection of OL3 after a bus fault was used as a contingency 
in the simulations of the import situations. However, OL3 has not been commissioned 
yet, hence it was not connected to the grid in the Nordic network model. Therefore, the 
generation data of the OL3 unit had to be manually updated to the model. Being quite a 
large unit, the introduction of OL3 affected the power flows in the Finnish power system 
notably. Thus, the power flow in cut P1 had to be manually adjusted after the introduction 
of OL3.  
After the introduction of OL3, the initial power flow in cut P1 was set at 2400 MW in all 
import cases to simplify the comparison of the results. The RAC import was at its 
maximum market capacity of 1500 MW in all the studied situations. The adjustments 
were made by reducing the border power flows, mainly in the Fennoskan links, and in 
some cases also by reducing wind power. The Fennoskan links were chosen as they are 
located nearby the Olkiluoto power plant and thus, the impact of the adjustments on the 
power flows in the Finnish system were assumed to be minimal. On the other hand, wind 
power was adjusted as all the Finnish wind generation resources are not yet included in 
the network model anyway.       
The steady-state voltage stability studies were performed using the PV analysis tool of 
PSS/E. The tool increased the P1 transfer by 20 MW increments and after every 
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increment, the contingency was automatically applied and the power flow was solved. 
The switched shunts and tap changers were locked during the calculation, i.e. they were 
not performing adjustments during the PV analysis. The dynamic analysis was carried 
out after the steady-state analysis. The dynamic analysis was based on the transfer level 
defined by the 355 kV voltage criterion in PV analysis. In other words, the P1 transfer 
was set at level defined by the 355 kV voltage criterion before performing the dynamic 
simulations. The 𝑃-𝑉 curves and dynamics graphs of the import cases are presented in 
Chapters 6.1.1–6.1.3. The descriptions of the base cases along with the initial power 
flows are presented in the beginning of each chapter. A summary of the results is shown 
in Chapter 6.1.4.  
6.1.1 Summer and winter   
The results of the voltage stability studies of the summer and winter situations are 
presented in this chapter. In the summer case, the load in the Finnish power system was 
8680 MW and generation 6410 MW. In the winter case, the load was 11880 MW and 
generation 10550 MW. 
The power flows of the main border connections and cut P1 in the summer and winter 
base cases are presented in Figure 6.1. The power flows in Figure 6.1 represent the 
initial condition from which the P1 power flow was increased by the PV analysis tool. The 
RAC import and P1 power flow were the same in both situations. The power flow of the 
Fennoskan links was from Sweden to Finland in the summer situation and from Finland 
to Sweden in the winter situation as shown in Figure 6.1. Another main difference was 
the magnitude of the power import from Russia which was 250 MW higher in summer.  
The summer base case represents a typical import situation from early summer. The 
Olkiluoto 1 nuclear unit was disconnected from the grid due to a yearly revision and the 
Estlink 2 HVDC connection was also out of service in the summer base case. The longer 
service outages of the generation units and transmission lines are typically taking place 
in the summer as the load demand is lower. There were no outages in the Finnish power 
system in the winter base case and the load in the Finnish power system was relatively 
high, but not at its peak. A transit flow situation from northern Sweden to southern 
Sweden through Finland existed in the winter case. That is rather uncommon in the 
winter, especially when the load demand is high in Finland. When the surplus of hydro 
power production exists in northern Sweden, some of it can be transferred to southern 
Sweden through Finland if the internal transmission capacity in Sweden is fully utilized. 
Typically, the transit flow situation exists in springtime.  
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Figure 6.1. Border transmissions in megawatts in the summer and winter situations. 
Background map from [47]. 
The results of the PV analysis are presented in Figure 6.2. The summer situation was 
calculated using the Full Newton-Raphson algorithm as using the Fixed-slope decoupled 
Newton-Raphson algorithm the power flow was not converging in high enough transfer 
levels to reach the lowest voltage criteria. The winter situation was calculated using the 
Fixed-slope decoupled Newton-Raphson algorithm because in that case the 
convergence problems emerged as the Full Newton-Raphson algorithm was used. 
Figure 6.2 shows the lowest post-contingency voltages of the summer and winter 
situations as a function of increase in the initial P1 transfer. 
The lowest voltage was in the Alapitkä substation in the summer situation and in the 
Alajärvi substation in the winter situation. The reason for that appeared to be the 
distribution of the power flows in the Finnish power system. In the winter situation, a 
transit flow from northern to southern Sweden through Finland existed. In that case, the 
western P1 lines carry a higher load and thus, the Alajärvi substation located in western 
Finland was loaded more in the winter situation.  
The pre-contingency 𝑃-𝑉 curves and the post-contingency voltages of both Alapitkä and 
Alajärvi substations in the summer and winter situations are presented in Appendix A. 
The pre-contingency voltage in the winter situation is only a little higher than in the 
summer situation at the beginning of the calculation. However, an apparent difference is 
shown in the post-contingency voltages in Figure 6.2. According to Appendix A, the 
difference in the post-contingency voltages can be seen in both Alapitkä and Alajärvi 
substations. Thus, there is a broader voltage stability problem in the summer situation. 
In the winter situation, the 0,8875 pu voltage is reached at much higher transmission 
Summer 
 
Winter 
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level than in the summer situation. This is explained by the better voltage support in the 
winter situation, as the pre-contingency voltage is also greater in the winter situation at 
the end of the calculation. The better voltage support in the winter situation is due to the 
greater number of generators in operation and supplying reactive power to the grid. 
 
Figure 6.2. The lowest bus voltages as a function of increase in the P1 transfer in the 
summer and winter situations. 
The dynamic analysis was performed after the PV analysis. The situations analyzed by 
the dynamic simulations were chosen from the results of the PV analysis. The transfer 
level defined by the lowest voltage criterion (0,8875 pu) was used to examine if the 
transmission capacity is limited by dynamic stability or does the steady-state PV analysis 
yield a smaller capacity. Thus, the P1 transfer was 2940 MW in the summer situation 
and 3510 MW in the winter situation in the dynamic simulations. The results of the 
simulations are presented in Figure 6.3. The lowest voltages were in the same 
substations as in the PV analysis. 
The OL3 unit was disconnected from the grid as a consequence of a fault a second after 
the beginning of the simulation. As Figure 6.3 shows, the initial voltage level was slightly 
higher in the winter situation. However, voltage stabilizes to a lower level in the winter 
situation than in the summer situation. On the other hand, the post-contingency voltage 
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swings are greater in the summer situation. That can be explained by the lower amount 
of generation resources connected to the grid in summer resulting in the system being 
prone to greater voltage oscillation.  
 
Figure 6.3. Results of the dynamic simulations of the summer and winter situations. 
According to Figure 6.3, the post-contingency voltage levels out to about 0.96 pu in the 
summer situation and to 0.94 pu in the winter situation. The voltage dip of the first swing 
after the fault transient is clearly above the 0.8 pu criterion in both situations. Thus, the 
dynamic voltage stability is not the transmission capacity limiting factor in these 
situations. The steady-state voltage criteria are yielding the more conservative estimates 
of the transmission capacities in both summer and winter situations.  
The variance in the results of the dynamic analysis and steady-state calculations comes 
from the differences in the modelling of the loads and generators. The loads are modelled 
as constant power loads in the load flow calculations whereas in the dynamic analysis 
they are converted to the combinations of the constant power-, constant current- and 
constant impedance loads as discussed in Chapter 5.2. The modelling of the loads was 
observed to have a remarkable effect on the simulation results in [44]. The dynamic 
model also includes proper models of the generator’s control systems which improve the 
results of the dynamic analysis.  
The effects that applying different steady-state voltage criteria would have on the P1 
transmission capacity in the summer and winter situations are presented in Table 6.1. 
The results are derived from Figure 6.2, and they are shown as a maximum increase in 
the initial P1 transfer while each voltage criterion is applied. The margins to the voltage 
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collapse points are also presented for each criterion in Table 6.1. The margins were 
defined based on the 𝑃-𝑉 curves in Figure 6.2 and the last transfer level achieving 
convergence in the PV analysis was considered the voltage collapse point. However, the 
𝑃-𝑉 curves in Figure 6.2 do not quite reach the tip point but the situations became 
numerically unstable in the PV analysis. 
Table 6.1. The maximum increase in the P1 transfer based on the steady-state voltage 
criteria and the margins to the voltage collapse point for each criterion in the summer 
and winter situations. 
Operating situation 
Voltage criterion 
370 kV 
(0.9250 pu) 
365 kV 
(0.9125 pu) 
360 kV 
(0.9000 pu) 
355 kV 
(0.8875 pu) 
Winter 
Increase in the P1 trans-
fer (MW) 
680 840 1000 1110 
Margin to the voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
500 340 180 70 
Summer 
Increase in the P1 trans-
fer (MW) 
260 380 470 540 
Margin to the voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
300 180 90 20 
The results in Table 6.1 show the major difference between the transmission capacities 
of the summer and winter situations. The increase in the initial P1 transmission 
corresponding each voltage criteria is over two times greater in the winter situation than 
in the summer situation. The margins to the voltage collapse point are also considerably 
greater in the winter situation.  
6.1.2 Wind- and hydro power peak production  
In the wind power peak situation, the load in the Finnish power system was 9980 MW 
and generation 8840 MW. Wind power constituted approximately 1700 MW of the 
generation capacity. In the hydro power peak situation, the load was 10060 MW and 
generation 8390 MW. The amount of hydro power production was 2600 MW.   
The power flows of the main border connections and cut P1 in both base cases are 
presented in Figure 6.4. The import from southern Sweden to Finland was some 500 
MW higher in the hydro power peak situation. In addition, the export from Finland to 
Estonia was higher in the wind power peak situation. There was no border transfer from 
Russia in the hydro power peak case whereas in the wind power situation 370 MW was 
imported from Russia to Finland.  
In the wind power peak situation, the Fennoskan 1 HVDC link was out of service. The 
real-time data of the wind power peak case was from the end of September, whereas 
the real-time data of the Hydro power peak case was from the beginning of May when 
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the peak in hydro power production typically takes place. The Olkiluoto 2 unit was not in 
operation in the hydro power peak situation. Both of the situations represent rather typical 
operating conditions from the corresponding season of a year. The summer version of 
the Nordic network model was used in both cases.  
 
Figure 6.4 Border transmissions in megawatts in the wind- and hydro power peak 
situations. Background map from [47]. 
The results of the PV analysis are presented in Figure 6.5. The wind power peak situation 
was calculated using the Full Newton-Raphson algorithm as using that method the 
convergence was achieved in 40 MW higher transfer than using the fixed-slope algorithm 
and thus, the voltage collapse was shown more clearly. In the hydro power peak 
situation, the Full Newton-Raphson algorithm was not converging in high enough P1 
transfer to reach the lower voltage limits. Hence, the Fixed-slope decoupled Newton-
Raphson algorithm was used in that case. 
The lowest voltage was in Alapitkä substation in both cases due to the transfer situation. 
The Alapitkä substation is normally highly loaded, especially as power is imported to 
Estonia. In the wind power peak situation, there were more generators in operation in 
the Finnish power system due to the season of the year. That explains the differences in 
the curves in Figure 6.5 to some extent. The slope of the hydro power curve changes 
significantly when the P1 transfer is increased over 400 MW. The main reason for that 
appears to be the used iteration algorithm as the Fixed-slope decoupled Newton-
Raphson method was discovered to produce 𝑃-𝑉 curves with tighter bends in the middle 
whereas the curves produced by the Full Newton-Raphson algorithm were smoother as 
can be seen in Figure 6.5. 
An evident difference is visible in the 𝑃-𝑉 curves in Figure 6.5. The voltage level is higher 
in the wind power peak situation. According to Appendix A, the difference in post-
Wind power peak 
 
Hydro power peak 
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contingency voltages exist in both Alajärvi and Alapitkä substations. However, the pre-
contingency voltages in Appendix A are not differing much in the beginning of the 
calculation. The main differences between the two situations which may cause the 
variance in the 𝑃-𝑉 curves in Figure 6.5 are the lack of Olkiluoto 2 in the hydro power 
peak situation and the location of the generation units in operation in the situations. The 
wind turbines are concentrated in western and northern Finland, whereas hydro power 
is primarily located in northern Finland. Hence, the voltage support in Alapitkä is poorer 
in the hydro power peak situation. That is demonstrated in Appendix A where the Alajärvi 
substation post-contingency voltage curve in the hydro power peak situation is close to 
the Alapitkä post-contingency voltage curve in the wind power peak situation. The 0,8875 
pu voltage level is achieved in lower P1 transfer in the hydro power peak situation, which 
is also explained by the lack of reactive power support. 
 
Figure 6.5. The lowest bus voltages as a function of increase in the P1 transfer in the 
wind- and hydro power peak situations. 
The results of the dynamic simulations of the wind- and hydro power peak situations are 
presented in Figure 6.6. In the dynamic analysis, the pre-contingency P1 transfer was 
2890 MW in the hydro power peak situation and 3020 MW in the wind power peak 
situation corresponding to the transfers defined by the 0,8875 pu voltage limit in the PV 
analysis. According to Figure 6.6, the voltages stabilize to slightly under 0.95 pu at the 
end of the simulations and the post-contingency first swing voltage is clearly over the 0.8 
pu limit in both cases. However, the voltage swings are greater in the wind power 
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situation. The reason for that may be the lower number of generators in operation in the 
wind power peak situation. On the other hand, the used dynamic model did not include 
proper models of all the wind turbines which may affect the results of the dynamic 
analysis. Furthermore, the P1 transmission is greater in the wind power peak situation 
and thus, the reactive power demand differs between the two situations. 
 
Figure 6.6. Results of the dynamic simulations of the wind- and hydro power peak situ-
ations. 
As in the summer and winter situations, the dynamic voltage stability did not turn out to 
be the transmission capacity limiting factor in the wind- and hydro power peak situations 
either. The effects that applying different steady-state voltage criteria would have on the 
P1 transfer capacity in the wind- and hydro power peak cases are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. The maximum increase in the P1 transfer based on the steady-state voltage 
criteria and the margins to the voltage collapse point in the wind- and hydro power 
peak situations. 
Operating situation 
Voltage criterion 
370 kV 
(0.925 pu) 
365 kV 
(0.9125 pu) 
360 kV    
(0.9 pu) 
355 kV 
(0.8875 pu) 
Wind power 
peak 
Increase in the P1  
transfer (MW) 
260 430 540 620 
Margin to the voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
440 270 160 80 
Hydro power 
peak 
Increase in the P1 
transfer (MW) 
10 210 410 490 
Margin to the voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
520 320 120 40 
The results in Table 6.2 indicate that the P1 transmission capacity corresponding each 
voltage criterion is higher in the wind power peak situation than in the hydro power peak 
situation. The difference is larger when the two stricter voltage criteria are applied. When 
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the 360 kV and 355 kV criteria are applied, the differences between the situations 
decrease. A plausible explanation for the difference is the better voltage support in the 
wind power peak situation in lower transfer. As the transfer is increased, the reactive 
power capacity is consumed and the voltages start to decrease faster in the wind power 
peak situation. The differences in the margins to the voltage collapse points are smaller 
than the differences in the transmission capacities. The estimated margin is only 40–80 
MW higher in the wind power peak situation. 
6.1.3 Power line outages 
The load in the Finnish power system in the line outage 1 situation was 10800 MW and 
generation 9250 MW. In the line outage 2 situation, the load was 10870 MW and 
generation 9850 MW. In the line outage 1 situation, the Huutokoski-Alapitkä power line 
was out of service. The line is located in the eastern part of cut P1. In the line outage 
case 2, two power lines were out of service, the first one being the Petäjäskoski-
Pirttikoski line in northern Finland and the second the Hirvisuo-Jylkkä line which belongs 
to the western part of cut P1. 
The main border transfers of the power line outage base cases are presented in Figure 
6.7. Power flows in the Estonian and Russian border connections are almost the same 
in both cases. The import from southern Sweden to Finland is higher in the power line 
outage 1 situation. Both of the situations are taking place in the early spring.  
 
Figure 6.7. Border transmissions in megawatts in the power line outage situations. 
Background map from [47]. 
The results of the PV analysis are presented in Figure 6.8. Both of the cases were 
calculated using the Full Newton-Raphson algorithm as it achieved convergence in 
Power line outage 1 
 
Power line outage 2 
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slightly higher transfers than the Fixed-slope decoupled Newton-Raphson algorithm. 
However, there were only minor differences between the iteration algorithms.  
 
Figure 6.8. The lowest bus voltages as a function of increase in the P1 transfer in 
the power line outage situations. 
The lowest voltage in the line outage 1 situation was in the Alajärvi substation. In the line 
outage 2 situation, the lowest voltage was in the Alapitkä substation. In Figure 6.8, the 
voltage level is higher in the line outage 1 situation. Similar difference exists also in the 
pre-contingency curves in Appendix A at lower transfer levels.  
The explanation for the lowest voltage in Alajärvi in the line outage 1 situation is the 
power line out of service in that case. The Huutokoski-Alapitkä line is usually highly 
loaded, and when it is disconnected, the load is divided into the remaining P1 lines which 
increases the loading of the Alajärvi substation. On the other hand, the Hirvisuo-Jylkkä 
line is not usually loaded as much as the other P1 lines. However, the remaining P1 lines 
are usually already highly loaded and as the Hirvisuo-Jylkkä line is disconnected in the 
line outage 2 situation, they must carry even higher load. The Alapitkä substation voltage 
is lower in the line outage 2 situation because the power flow is concentrated on the 
eastern P1 power line. The disconnection of the Petäjäskoski-Pirttikoski power line was 
not discovered to have a significant effect on the P1 power flows.  
According to Appendix A, the post-contingency voltage in Alajärvi in the line outage 2 
situation is also lower than the Alapitkä substation voltage in the line outage 1 situation. 
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Thus, the voltage stability problem in the line outage 2 situation is broader due to 
insufficient reactive power support when the P1 lines in operation are highly loaded. For 
the same reason, voltage drops and the load flow calculation is terminated at lower 
transfer level in the line outage 2 situation. 
In dynamic simulations, the P1 transfer was 3010 MW in the line outage 1 situation and 
2820 MW in the line outage 2 situation. The results of the dynamic simulations are shown 
in Figure 6.9. The lowest post-contingency voltage stabilized to 0.94 pu in the line outage 
2 situation and the first post-contingency voltage swing stayed over the 0.8 pu limit in 
both cases. The voltage level of the line outage 1 situation was approximately 0.925 pu 
at the end of the dynamic analysis. Currently, Fingrid uses a 0.925 pu limit for the post-
contingency steady-state voltage in the dynamic analysis. Thus, the power transfer in 
the line outage 1 situation corresponding to the 355 kV steady-state voltage criterion 
would be the last acceptable if the 0.925 pu limit was used in the dynamic analysis.  
 
Figure 6.9. Results of the dynamic simulations of the power line outage situations. 
The amplitudes of the voltage swings in Figure 6.9 are not differing greatly. That is an 
expected result as the operating situations were quite similar. For example, almost the 
same number of generators were in operation in both situations. However, the voltage 
level at the end of the simulations was lower in the line outage 1 situation although the 
initial voltage was higher in that case as shown in Figure 6.9 as well as in Figure 6.8. 
The difference is affected by the variance in the modelling of loads and generators. In 
the dynamic simulations, the control systems of the generators are included and thus, 
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the generators in the Finnish power system may increase power production after the 
contingency, whereas in the load flow calculations the power balance is controlled by 
one swing bus. 
The dynamic voltage stability did not turn out to be the transmission capacity limiting 
factor in the power line outage situations either. The transmission capacities defined by 
the steady-state voltage stability criteria in the power line outage situations are presented 
in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.3. The maximum increase in the P1 transfer and the margins to the voltage 
collapse point based on the steady-state voltage criteria for each criterion in the power 
line outage situations. 
Operating situation 
Voltage criterion 
370 kV 
(0.925 pu) 
365 kV 
(0.9125 pu) 
360 kV    
(0.9 pu) 
355 kV 
(0.8875 pu) 
Line outage 1 
Increase in the P1  
transfer (MW) 
240 400 520 610 
Margin to the voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
510 350 230 140 
Line outage 2 
Increase in the P1 
transfer (MW) 
0 210 350 420 
Margin to the voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
430 220 80 10 
 
As the results in Table 6.3 show, the transmission capacity in cut P1 is at least 170 MW 
higher in the line outage 1 situation than in the line outage 2 situation applying any of the 
steady-state voltage criteria. If the 370 kV limit is used, the difference between the two 
cases is the greatest as the initial P1 transfer can not be increased at all in the line outage 
2 situation in order to fulfill the voltage criterion. The voltage stability security margin is 
over 100 MW higher in the line outage 1 situation using almost any of the voltage limits. 
If the 370 kV criterion is used, the difference in the margins is 80 MW. 
6.1.4 Summary 
The results of the import situations’ simulations are summarized in Table 6.4. The 
transmission capacities corresponding each voltage criterion are shown as total P1 
transfers. However, the capacities do not represent the actual technical transmission 
capacities as only the voltage stability related limitations were studied. To determine the 
real transmission capacities, other limitations such as the loadability of the transmission 
lines should also be considered. 
According to Table 6.4, the lowest transmission capacities are in the line outage 2 and 
hydro power peak situations. On the other hand, the transmission capacity is clearly 
49 
 
highest in the winter situation. Both of the outage situations are also taking place in 
winter, but the power line outages are reducing the transmission capacity significantly. 
Table 6.4. Results of the voltage stability studies 
Operating situation 
Voltage criterion 
370 kV 
(0.9250 pu) 
365 kV 
(0.9125 pu) 
360 kV    
(0.9000 pu) 
355 kV 
(0.8875 pu) 
Winter 
P1 transfer (MW) 3080 3240 3400 3510 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
500 340 180 70 
Summer 
P1 transfer (MW) 2660 2780 2870 2940 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
300 180 90 20 
Wind power 
peak 
P1 transfer (MW) 2660 2830 2940 3020 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
440 270 160 80 
Hydro power 
peak 
P1 transfer (MW) 2410 2610 2810 2890 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
520 320 120 40 
Line outage 1 
P1 transfer (MW) 2640 2800 2920 3010 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
510 350 230 140 
Line outage 2 
P1 transfer (MW) 2400 2610 2750 2820 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
430 220 80 10 
Both the Full Newton-Raphson and Fixed-slope decoupled Newton-Raphson iteration 
algorithms were used in the steady-state calculations. The used algorithm was chosen 
based on which one resulted in convergence in higher transfer. It was found that the 
results were not differing at all in lower transfer levels regardless off the chosen 
algorithm. However, minor differences were found between the two algorithms at the 
transfer levels corresponding the 360 and 355 kV voltage criteria resulting in the shape 
of the 𝑃-𝑉 curve being slightly different depending on the used algorithm. In some cases, 
the convergence was achieved in high enough transfers to define the transmission 
capacities corresponding the 360 or 355 kV voltage criteria only by using the other of the 
algorithms. All in all, the choice of the iteration algorithm did not prove to have a 
significant effect on the results.  
The security margins of the import situations were examined also enabling the switched 
shunts to perform adjustments in the PV analysis. The study is presented in Appendix B. 
The results of the study indicate that Table 6.4 presents a more conservative estimate 
of the security margins in most cases, i.e. the margins were smaller when the switched 
shunts were locked in almost all situations apart from the winter situation. 
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6.2 Export situations 
Such as in the import situations, the Olkiluoto 3 power plant was connected to the grid 
also in the export situations. However, the contingency in the export situations was the 
disconnection of the Fennoskan 2 HVDC link which was found to cause greater 
oscillations in the Finnish power system.  
The Fennoskan HVDC links were set at full export in all base cases. In addition, the RAC 
export was set at its 1200 MW maximum technical export capacity. The more precise 
descriptions of the power flows along with the load and generation in the base cases are 
presented in Table 6.5. The import from Russia was near the maximum capacity in all 
the cases. The Estonian import was also near the maximum capacity of the Estlink HVDC 
links in most cases. In the power line outage situation, only minor import from Estonia 
existed and in the wind power peak situation about half of the Estlinks capacity was used. 
The load and generation in the Finnish power system varied between 7000 MW and over 
11000 MW corresponding the low load condition in summer and high load condition in 
winter. There is a balance between load and generation in Finland in the summer and 
winter cases. In the power line outage and wind power peak cases, a surplus of 
generation exists in Finland. 
Table 6.5. Border transfers along with the load and generation in the Finnish power 
system in export situations. Negative value in the border transfers means export from 
Finland and positive value means import to Finland. 
Operating 
situation 
RAC 
(MW) 
Fennoskan 
(MW) 
Estlink 
(MW) 
Russia 
(MW) 
Load in 
Finland 
(MW) 
Generation 
in Finland 
(MW) 
Summer 1 -1200 -1200 980 1300 7000 7230 
Summer 2 -1200 -1200 1005 1400 7500 7635 
Winter 1 -1200 -1200 990 1380 9240 9415 
Winter 2 -1200 -1200 1005 1400 10415 10560 
Power line 
outage 
-1200 -1200 90 1250 9900 11250 
Wind 
power peak 
-1200 -1200 560 1300 9400 10075 
The simulations were performed by setting the initial value for the P1 power flow, running 
the dynamic simulation and then conducting the Prony analysis to determine the 
damping ratio of the 0.3 Hz oscillation mode. Based on the damping of the initial transfer, 
the P1 transfer was either increased or decreased to achieve the 6 % damping ratio. The 
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adjustment of the P1 transfer was made by shifting the loads between the northern and 
southern Finland. The P1 transfers corresponding to the damping ratios of 5, 4 and 3 % 
were then solved by further increasing the transfer. The transfer was finally increased to 
the point the oscillations were no longer damping. 
The Prony analysis tool is illustrated in Figure 6.10. The starting position of the analysis 
was selected so that the nonlinear part in the beginning of the signal was cut out. 
Typically, the starting position of the analysis was the second oscillation, the time frame 
being about 5-8 seconds from the beginning of the simulation as shown in Figure 6.10. 
The reduced-order approximation producing the smallest root-mean-square error 
between the linear prediction model and the original signal was used if possible. 
However, the Prony’s method may overfit the linear prediction model if the used model 
order is too high leading to some oscillation modes in the signal splitting into several 
modes. Therefore, the model order had to be manually optimized for each case 
minimizing the fitting error and avoiding the root splitting.  
 
Figure 6.10. A view of the Prony analysis tool. 
The results of the damping studies are shown in Table 6.6. The P1 transfers along with 
the margins to the undamped transfer corresponding each damping criterion are 
presented in Table 6.6 for the studied operating situations. For comparison purposes, 
the transmission capacities determined by Fingrid’s current damping criterion including 
the 200 MW security margin are also shown in Table 6.6. The summer 1 and summer 2 
52 
 
cases are low load summer situations whereas the other base cases are higher load 
winter situations. The Keminmaa substation voltage curve was utilized in the damping 
studies of all export situations.  
Table 6.6. Results of the damping studies using the damping ratios and Fingrid’s 
current criterion.  
Operating situation 
Damping criterion 
6 % 5 % 4 % 3 % Current 
Summer 1 
P1 transfer (MW) 1550 1600 1675 1700 1520 
Margin to undamped 
condition (MW) 
175 125 50 25 205 
Summer 2 
P1 transfer (MW) 2050 2075 2100 2125 1970 
Margin to undamped 
condition (MW) 
140 115 90 65 220 
Winter 1 
P1 transfer (MW) 1100 1300 1400 1550 1450 
Margin to undamped 
condition (MW) 
600 400 300 150 250 
Winter 2 
P1 transfer (MW) 1800 2000 2200 2400 2400 
Margin to undamped 
condition (MW) 
850 650 450 250 250 
Line outage 
P1 transfer (MW) 1800 2000 2100 2250 2150 
Margin to undamped 
condition (MW) 
580 380 280 130 230 
Wind power 
peak 
P1 transfer (MW) 1100 1350 1425 1525 1500 
Margin to undamped 
condition (MW) 
650 400 325 225 250 
The results indicate that regarding damping, there are differences not only between the 
summer and winter situations but also between the various situations from the same 
season of the year. The best damping occurs in the winter 2 situation if the lower damping 
ratios are examined, and the worst in the winter 1- and wind power peak situations. In 
both summer situations, damping is in the middle range. 
In the summer situations, the increments in the P1 transfers between the different 
damping ratios are smaller than in the winter situations. In the summer situations, the P1 
transfer was increased only 25-75 MW to reach the lower damping ratio. For example, 
in the summer 1 situation, the difference in the P1 transmission between the 4 % and 3 
% damping ratios was only 25 MW. In the winter situations, the minimum increase was 
100 MW but in most cases the increment was greater than that.  
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If the damping ratios are examined, another significant difference between the summer 
and winter situations indicated by the result in Table 6.6 is the magnitude of margins to 
the undamped transfer. In the winter situations, the margins are clearly greater than in 
the summer situations. In the summer situations, the P1 transfer corresponding to the 3 
% damping ratio is within a few dozen megawatts of the unstable transfer. In the winter 
situations, the smallest margin applying the 3 % criterion is 130 MW occurring in the line 
outage situation as the P1 transfer is 2250 MW. However, if the magnitude of the margin 
is compared in relation to the transfer level, the winter 1 situation is worse because the 
P1 transfer corresponding to 3 % damping ratio is only 1550 MW the margin being 150 
MW in that case.    
In the summer cases, there is a major difference in damping between the two operating 
situations. If the winter situations are examined, the results in Table 6.6 indicate that 
damping is relatively similar in the winter 1 and wind power peak situations. The same 
concerns the winter 2 and line outage situations. However, there are some differences 
in the magnitudes of transfers corresponding to the stricter damping criteria in the similar 
damping conditions. 
To examine the possible causes of differences in damping between the operating 
situations from the summer and winter seasons, the number of synchronous generators 
equipped with power system stabilizers (PSS) in operation was counted. The number of 
generators equipped with PSS in the studied situations is presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7. The number of generators equipped with power system stabilizers in op-
eration in the export situations. 
Operating 
situation 
Summer 1 Summer 2 Winter 1 Winter 2 
Line 
outage 
Wind 
power peak 
Generators 
with PSSs 
and their 
maximum 
power 
17 
(4965 MW) 
17 
(5692 MW) 
21 
(5618 MW) 
24 
(6250 MW) 
25 
(6309 MW) 
20 
(5555 MW) 
> 100 MW 
generators 
with PSSs 
and their 
maximum 
power 
 
8 
(4427 MW) 
11 
(5197 MW) 
11 
(4625 MW) 
13 
(5435 MW) 
11 
(5450 MW) 
10 
(4601 MW) 
According to Table 6.7, the number of synchronous generators in operation equipped 
with power system stabilizers in the winter situations appears to correlate with damping 
in those situations. In the winter 1 and wind power peak situations, the P1 transmission 
capacities are equal and so are the number of generators equipped with power system 
stabilizers. A similar trend is visible in winter 2 and line outage situations. However, in 
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the summer situations the difference in transmission capacities is not associated with the 
number of generators in operation equipped with PSSs as the count of generators is the 
same in both summer 1 and summer 2 situations. 
To examine the differences in the transmission capacities of the summer situations, the 
features of the synchronous generators in operation were compared. It turned out that 
the larger generators contribute damping more than the smaller ones. As Table 6.7 
shows, the count of the generators equipped with PSSs is the same in both summer 
situations, but there are larger generators in operation in the summer 2 situation and 
thus, the damping is better leading to higher transmission capacity. A similar trend is 
visible in the winter situations if the number of over 100 MW generators is compared. 
The transmission capacities are higher in the winter 2 and line outage situations and the 
larger generators were also in operation then. When the largest generators equipped 
with power system stabilizers were in operation in the Finnish power system, damping 
was considerably better in the studied situations.  
In the line outage situation, the number of generators equipped with power system 
stabilizers in operation is the largest among the export situations. The largest generators 
are also in operation in that case as can be seen in Table 6.7 if the count and the 
maximum power of over 100 MW generators are compared. However, the P1 
transmission capacity is lower than in the winter 2 situation if the 3 % and 4 % damping 
criteria are applied. The reason for that is the higher loading of the remaining P1 
transmission lines as the Hirvisuo-Jylkkä line is out of service leading to worse damping. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
As predicted, the import and export transmission capacities of the cut P1 turned out to 
have a major variance due to different capacity limiting phenomena. The transmission 
capacity is limited by angle stability in the export situations whereas voltage stability is 
the limiting factor in the import situations. 
The transmission capacities presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis are not market 
capacities, neither are they proper technical capacities, as only voltage- and angle 
stability were considered in the research ignoring other limitations in the studied 
situations. The results also hold good only in the studied situations. However, the results 
indicate the differences in the transmission capacities in various conditions using 
different calculation criteria. 
7.1 Voltage criterion 
The dynamic voltage stability did not prove to be a transmission capacity limiting factor 
in any of the import situations. Thus, the steady-state analysis yielded the more 
conservative estimations of the transmission capacities in the studied situations. 
However, the dynamic analysis is considered producing more realistic results due to the 
more advanced modelling of the power system. The results indicate the reduction of the 
voltage criterion would increase the transmission capacity but decrease the voltage 
stability security margin. That is in line with the findings in [44]. 
The research confirms that the P1 transmission capacity from south to north varies 
depending on the operating situation. The season of the year appeared to have a 
noticeable influence on the transmission capacity mainly due to different generation 
resources and loads in the grid. The major difference in the results is between the 
transmission capacities of the summer and winter situations, the transmission capacity 
being over twice higher in winter than in summer. Voltage level appeared to decrease 
slower in the winter situation than in the other studied situations. The power line outages 
appeared to reduce the transmission capacity bringing it closer to the summer situations 
given that the line outages were taking place in winter. The wind- and hydro power peak 
situations were not found to have a major influence on the transmission capacity 
compared with the summer situation. 
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Concerning security, the voltage stability security margins turned out to have minor 
variance between the different operating situations although the transmission capacities 
varied more. On the other hand, if the switched shunts were enabled to perform 
adjustments in PV analysis, the margins were in most cases greater than if the switched 
shunts were locked. According to the results of this thesis, the security of the Finnish 
power system does not appear to be endangered if the currently used voltage limit was 
slightly reduced. However, the security margins of the 355 kV voltage limit proved to be 
such small in the studied situations, that using 355 kV as a calculation criterion should 
be treated with caution. 
According to Fingrid’s Specifications for the Operational Performance of Power 
Generating Facilities, the type D generators, which means over 30 MW generators or 
generators connected to 110 kV or higher voltage network, must remain connected to 
the grid in voltage fluctuations between 90–105 % of the nominal voltage. The generators 
are allowed to disconnect from the grid without time margins if the voltage drops below 
90 % of the nominal voltage. [48, pp. 11, 47–48] In 400 kV network, the operation range 
of the generators is 360–420 kV. Thus, using the 355 kV voltage level as a transmission 
capacity calculation criterion might cause a risk for the disconnection of some generators 
in consequence of a contingency. The disconnection of the generators could lead to 
voltage instability especially as the voltage stability security margins appeared to be fairly 
small using the 355 kV voltage limit. 
In this thesis, the lowest voltages in the 400 kV network were in the Alapitkä and Alajärvi 
substations. However, no generators are connected to those substations, but the nearest 
generators are connected to the lower voltage network distant from the 400 kV 
substations. Thus, the voltage level in the nearest generator bus is likely not to decrease 
as much as in the 400 kV bus due to the voltage support of the generator and the 
impedance of the lower voltage network between the generator bus and the 400 kV bus. 
Hence, the voltage stability security margin in the generator bus is likely to be greater 
than in the 400 kV bus which decreases the risk of the generation disconnection. 
The majority of loads and generation are connected to lower than 400 kV network. Thus, 
the actual voltage levels or margins to the voltage collapse point in the grid connection 
points of the loads and generators cannot be determined by calculating the voltages in 
the 400 kV network. However, the voltage level in the 400 kV network currently acts as 
a transmission capacity calculation criterion sufficiently well especially when the shunt 
reactors are locked during the load flow calculation. If the switched shunts are performing 
adjustments during the calculation, the voltage level may remain rather high also near 
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the voltage collapse. In that case, the voltage level alone does not provide adequate 
information about the state of the power system. 
The loads were modelled as constant power loads in the steady-state load flow 
calculations and the voltage dependence of the loads was not taken into account. In 
reality, the loads normally reduce when the voltage level decreases resulting in the 
decreasing of the power transfer. Thus, the security margins included in the lower voltage 
criteria in Table 6.4 are likely to be somewhat greater in reality. On the other hand, the 
slope of the generator voltage controllers is not modelled in the used simulation model. 
Therefore, the reactive power support of the generators is better in the simulations than 
in reality.    
7.2 Damping criterion 
The results indicate that a major difference in damping exists between the summer and 
winter situations. The summer situations turned out be more sensitive regarding damping 
compared with the winter situations, the margins to the undamped condition being 
considerably smaller in the summer situations. The difference between the security 
margins of the summer and winter situations poses a challenge in choosing a consistent 
damping ratio to be used in the transmission capacity calculation.  
If the current damping criterion of Fingrid is compared with the damping ratios studied in 
this thesis, the results in Table 6.6 show that the margins to the undamped transfer are 
more consistent using the current criterion. If the damping ratios are used, the margins 
vary more between various operating situations. The results indicate that if the damping 
ratios of 6, 5 or 4 % are applied, the security margins are greater than in the currently 
used criterion in the winter situations. However, the stricter damping ratio is used, the 
more the calculated transmission capacity decreases.  
If the 3 % damping criterion was used as a transmission capacity calculation criterion, 
the transmission capacities would be quite similar to the capacities determined by the 
current calculation criterion but the security margins turned out to be smaller especially 
in the summer situations. On the other hand, the security margins of the summer 
situations proved to be smaller even if the 6 % damping criterion was used. Thus, 
regardless of the applied damping ratio, adding an extra security margin should be 
considered in the summer situations.  
To define a separate criterion for the summer situations, the summer situation should be 
unambiguously defined. In this thesis, the summer situation was defined to be from May 
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to September, but the time based classification is not necessary the most appropriate 
due to the variance of loads and generation resources in the power system. For example, 
the load and generation were under 8000 MW in both summer situations in this thesis. 
In the winter situations, the load and generation were over 9000 MW. However, it is 
possible to exceed the 9000 MW value also between May and September.  
Another possible mean to define separate calculation criteria for the operating conditions 
of poor and moderate damping would be the combination of the damping ratio and the 
generator capacity equipped with power system stabilizers. The capacity of the larger 
(over 100 MW) generators equipped with PSSs in the Finnish power system was under 
5000 MW in the situations of poor damping. When the damping was better, the PSS 
capacity was over 5000 MW. The combination of PSS capacity and damping would also 
eliminate the need to define the damping criterion based on the season of the year. 
Concerning wind power, the results did not indicate the damping to be directly 
proportional to the amount of wind power in the power system. However, if the share of 
wind power grows in the future and the large conventional power plants equipped with 
power system stabilizers are not in operation during the peak in wind power production, 
damping issues may emerge.  
The import from Russia to Finland was near the maximum capacity in all the studied 
situations. Thus, it would be beneficial to examine how does the volume of import from 
Russia affects damping. Concerning the used methodology, the Prony’s method causes 
some uncertainty in the results. The choice of the starting point in the Prony analysis 
affects the resulting damping ratio. The impact was tried to minimize by starting the 
analysis at as similar point as possible in all the studied situations. Another source of 
error in the Prony analysis is the nonlinearity of the examined signal. The Prony’s method 
fits a linear prediction model for the studied signal, and if it the signal is highly nonlinear, 
the results may become distorted. By cutting out the most nonlinear part of the signal, 
the distortion was aimed to be minimized. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
By analyzing different operating situations, this thesis has shown how choosing the 
transmission capacity calculation criteria for voltage stability and damping of the 
electromechanical oscillations would affect the transmission capacity and security 
margins of the Finnish power system. Decreasing the voltage criterion and changing the 
currently used damping criterion to a damping ratio were examined in this thesis.   
The research illustrates that decreasing the voltage criterion would increase the 
transmission capacity but reduce the security margin. However, the results show that a 
sufficient security margin is included in the 365 kV voltage criterion. The margins 
included in the 360 kV criterion were also moderate in the studied operating situations. 
Therefore, decreasing the voltage criterion slightly does not appear to endanger the 
security of the Finnish power system. 
However, 360 kV is the lower limit for the operation range of the generators and thus, 
the voltage criterion can not be set to below 360 kV. The 365 kV voltage limit appears to 
be a decent calculation criterion as the security margins to the voltage collapse point 
were sufficient in the simulations. In addition, the margins from the 365 kV limit to the 
360 kV limit were 90–200 MW in the situations examined in this thesis. 
Further research is needed to make certain that the voltage stability security margin is 
sufficient in various situations if the currently used voltage criterion was reduced. The 
security margins appeared to be smallest in the summer situation. In addition, the 
calculation settings were observed to have an effect on the calculated security margins 
due to the voltage collapse point mainly occurring at higher transfer level if the switched 
shunts were enabled to perform adjustments instead of keeping them locked.  
A major difference in damping was found between the summer and winter operating 
situations. The summer situations were observed to be more sensitive regarding 
electromechanical oscillations, i.e. a minor increase in the power transfer worsened 
damping clearly in the summer situations. The currently used damping criterion was 
found to correspond to a damping ratio of 3–4 % in the winter situations. In the summer 
situations, the transmission capacities and security margins determined by the current 
calculation criterion were closest to the ones determined by the 6 % damping ratio.  
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Damping in the summer situations is the limiting factor when choosing the calculation 
criterion. Based on the results of this thesis, the security margins included in the current 
damping criterion are more consistent in comparison with the margins included in the 
damping ratios in varying situations. Using the 3 % damping ratio can not be 
recommended in the summer situations due to the remarkably small security margins. 
At least, adding an extra security margin should be considered then.  
The 5 or 6 % damping ratios appear to be more reasonable calculation criteria even 
though the security margins included in the summer situations were still smaller than 
using the current calculation criterion. In addition, using the 5 or 6 % damping ratios as 
a calculation criterion would decrease the transmission capacity in the winter situations. 
Hence, the introduction of different calculation criteria for various operating situations 
should be considered or alternatively keeping the current damping criterion in use is 
recommended. 
For further research, the thermal limits of the transmission lines should be examined to 
define the real transmission capacities. In addition, the difference between the load flow 
calculations and dynamic analysis in the voltage stability studies would be beneficial to 
examine. This thesis proved the load flow calculations produce more conservative 
transmission capacities due to simpler modelling. However, it was not examined how 
large the difference is or if the difference is consistent in various situations. The behavior 
of the network model in extreme conditions should also be verified. The situations 
examined in this thesis were brought near the limits of the system operation, and it would 
be valuable to examine if the behavior of the model matches reality near the system 
collapse point.  
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APPENDIX A: P-V CURVES 
 
 
Figure A.1. Pre- and post-contingency 𝑃-𝑉 curves of the summer and winter situa-
tions. AP and AJ refer to the Alapitkä and Alajärvi substations. 
 
Figure A.2. Pre- and post-contingency 𝑃-𝑉 curves of the wind- and hyrdro power 
peak situations. AP and AJ refer to the Alapitkä and Alajärvi substations. 
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Figure A.3. Pre- and post-contingency 𝑃-𝑉 curves of the power line outage situa-
tions. AP and AJ refer to the Alapitkä and Alajärvi substations 
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APPENDIX B: PV ANALYSIS WITH SWITCHED 
SHUNTS ENABLED 
The steady-state voltage stability PV analysis was carried out enabling the switched 
shunts to perform adjustments to examine how the 𝑃-𝑉 curves and especially the security 
margins would change if the shunt reactors were adjusting the reactive power 
consumption as the loading of the transmission lines increases. The results are 
presented in Figure B.1. In the hydro power peak situation, the power flow calculation 
was not achieving convergence even if the P1 transfer was not increased at all from the 
initial value. Hence, the hydro power peak situation is lacking in Figure B.1.   
 
Figure B.1. 𝑃-𝑉 curves of the import situations when the switched shunts were per-
forming adjustments. 
The convergence was achieved in high enough transfer to show the voltage collapse 
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in Figure 6.8 and in Figure B.1 are compared, voltage remains over the 0.925 pu limit in 
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capacities in Table B.1 were determined in Chapter 6.1, and the voltage collapse points 
were considered being the last P1 transfers achieving convergence in Figure B.1 even 
though the actual voltage collapse points could not be defined as the calculation was not 
achieving convergence in high enough transfer levels due to numerical instability. 
Table B.1.  Margins to the voltage collapse points as the switched shunts were per-
forming adjustments. “-“ means that the margin could not be defined. 
Operating situation 
Voltage criterion 
370 kV 
(0.9250 pu) 
365 kV 
(0.9125 pu) 
360 kV    
(0.9000 pu) 
355 kV 
(0.8875 pu) 
Winter 
P1 transfer (MW) 3080 3240 3400 3510 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
440 280 120 10 
Summer 
P1 transfer (MW) 2660 2780 2870 2940 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
410 290 200 130 
Wind power 
peak 
P1 transfer (MW) 2660 2830 2940 3020 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
570 400 290 210 
Hydro power 
peak 
P1 transfer (MW) 2410 2610 2810 2890 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
- - - - 
Line outage 1 
P1  transfer (MW) 2640 2800 2920 3010 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
520 360 200 150 
Line outage 2 
P1 transfer (MW) 2400 2610 2750 2820 
Margin to voltage 
collapse point (MW) 
600 390 250 180 
 
Due to convergence issues in the simulations, the margins to voltage collapse points in 
Table B.1 are minimum values. The voltage collapse was achieved only in the line outage 
1 situation, and in the line outage 2 situation the voltage level dropped to under 0,925 
pu. Most of the margins in Table B.1 appear to be greater or the same compared with 
Table 6.4. The margins are smaller only in the winter situation in Table B.1. However, 
the actual voltage collapse point of the winter situation could not be defined and the 
voltage remains relatively high in the last transfer level in Figure B.1. On the other hand, 
the line outage 1 situation shows that the voltage collapse may occur suddenly. Although 
most of the margins in Table B.1 are greater than in Table 6.4, further research is needed 
to confirm the results. 
 
